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ABSTRACT 
Who should be the beneficiaries of racially targeted affirmative 
action?  In its Croson decision, the Supreme Court answered part of the 
“Who Question” when it conditioned affirmative action eligibility on 
underrepresentation.  What the Court did not tell us was underrepresentation 
of whom?  The Court thus instructs us to select beneficiary groups by 
counting heads, but leaves open which heads get counted where and what 
categories to use.   
By artificially separating what are necessarily related inquiries, the 
Court left a definitional lacuna that lower courts have struggled to fill.  Such 
definitional issues matter because they often determine who benefits from 
affirmative action.  Yet, the inconsistent approaches and conflicting 
outcomes in recent case law reveals the inadequacy of current doctrine to 
resolve such issues. 
While commentators have largely ignored the Who Question in the 
US, recent comparative scholarship has drawn attention to empirical 
methodologies used in India.  In contrast to the particularized discrimination 
targeted by Croson, India has explicitly adopted a societal approach to 
affirmative action that relies on empirical data to identify subordinated 
groups through sociological analysis.  A recent amicus brief filed before the 
US Supreme Court suggested that the US adopt India’s model as the answer 
to our Who Question. 
This Article critiques the amicus proposal, arguing that India’s 
approach does not provide a workable solution.  Nor would it be desirable 
even if it could.  Pressing the ambiguities of race would expose the 
normative incoherence of affirmative action in a way that would prove 
politically untenable.  However, even if India’s model cannot help us 
answer the “Who Question,” it does have some more modest uses.  It offers 
both a definitional tool to improve the categories we count with and a model 
for allocating decisional authority between courts and political actors.   
 
1TECHNICAL NOTE 
 
This Article weighs in at just over 29,000 words (29,551 total; 19,050 
in text and 10,501 in footnotes; excluding abstract, table of contents, 
and this note).   
 
The Article includes several data tables that are presented in graphics 
format.  To view them in Word, please use the “reading layout” or 
“print layout” setting. 
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1One evening in February 2004, Rocco Luiere went to sleep Hispanic 
and woke up White—at least in the eyes of New York State.  Luiere owned 
a construction company that bid on state highway projects.  Because 
Luiere’s maternal grandparents were born in Spain, his company had been 
certified as a minority-owned business enterprise (MBE) entitled to 
affirmative action set asides.  After doing business this way for fifteen 
years, Luiere learned that his MBE certification would not be renewed 
because New York no longer recognized people of Spanish descent as 
Hispanic.  Denied eligibility for affirmative action, Luiere found that he 
could not compete for state contracts.  He had to lay off a third of his 
workers and sell 30% of his equipment.1
Naturally, Luiere challenged the state’s decision.  After hearing his 
appeal, an administrative law judge noted that New York’s definition of 
“Hispanic” conflicted with federal standards, under which Luiere still 
qualified for affirmative action.2 The judge’s recommendation to reinstate 
Luiere’s MBE certification was overruled, however, by the state program 
director, who held that state-funded affirmative action was not bound by 
federal definitions.3 Luiere then challenged the New York’s Hispanic 
definition on equal protection grounds in federal district court.  That court 
denied Luiere’s request for a preliminary injunction, a ruling that was 
upheld on appeal.4
1 John O’Brien, State: You’re No Longer Hispanic; Definition Excludes People From 
Spain; Established Local Contractor Pay the Price, POST-STANDARD, June 13, 2004, A1.  
2 See In re: Appeal of Jana-Rock Construction, Recommended Order of James F. 
Horan, New York State Department of Economic Development, Division of Minority and 
Women’s Business Development, April 5, 2004, at 7-8. 
3 O’Brien, supra note 1. 
4 Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 5:04-CV-635, 
Memorandum-Decision and Order, Oct. 28, 2004 (N.D.N.Y.), at 36-37; 2006 U.S. App. 
Lexis 4050. 
2Luiere’s case throws into sharp relief an aspect of affirmative action 
rarely debated:  Who should be its beneficiaries?5 There are at least two 
aspects to this question: (1) selection: which racial/ethnic groups qualify?6
and (2) definition: what constitutes the boundaries of such groups?7 This 
Article will refer to these problems, respectively, as the “selection question” 
and “definition question” and collectively as the “Who Question.”  It will 
also address a meta-question: namely, who decides the Who Question?8
The 1989 landmark decision by the US Supreme Court in Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co. dealt with the selection question by conditioning 
affirmative action eligibility upon a showing of underrepresentation.9 The 
Court held that underrepresentation serves to identify discrimination that, in 
 
5 See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV.
855 (1995) (noting dearth of previous scholarship).  This Article focuses on voluntary 
affirmative action, as opposed to court-ordered remedies.  While some of the analysis here 
will doubtless bear on the latter case, a court’s equitable powers to craft a remedy present a 
very different normative context. 
6 Despite the frequent inclusion of women and/or veterans in affirmative action, this 
Article focuses solely on racial/ethnic beneficiaries.  Veterans present less classificatory 
challenges, as dispositive government records are generally available.  Classification by 
gender is also less problematic than race.  See Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, 302 (1978) (Opinion of Powell, J.).  This is not to say that gender 
never presents classificatory ambiguities in affirmative action.  Hayward Lee, a private 
consultant on MBE certification, describes a case in which a post-operative transsexual’s 
eligibility came under challenge.  Telephone Interview with Hayden Lee of Lee Associates 
in San Francisco, CA (January 28, 1998). 
7 In particular, this article focuses on definitional choices which determine which 
subgroups get included in standard racial categories:  For example, are Iberians 
“Hispanic”?  For reasons of space, it will set aside the classificatory challenges posed by 
individuals of mixed racial ancestry, cf. DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting the lack of objective criteria to determine individual identities), as well 
as the procedural problems of determining who gets placed in which box.  Cf.  Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (addressing procedural 
challenges).  In considering the Who Question, however, one should recognize that all of 
these dimensions are at play. 
8 In Luiere’s case, the question “who decides?” was framed both as a conflict between 
state vs. federal standards and between courts vs. policy-makers. 
9 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).  To this extent, the Court also answers the meta-question 
by staking out a controlling role for the judiciary to regulate the Who Question through 
constitutional interpretation.  Technically, Croson’s holding only applies to affirmative 
action to remedy past discrimination.  However, a similar methodology of “counting” 
applies under a diversity rationale with no more clarity regarding whom to count.  See 
Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of What?, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 129, 130 (1996). 
3a particularized context, can legitimate a racially targeted remedy.  What the 
Court did not tell us was underrepresentation of whom?  In other words, the 
Court instructs us to select beneficiaries by counting heads, while leaving 
open the definitional question of which heads get counted in which column 
or even what the categories should be.10 
Rocco Luiere’s case highlights the problems posed by this lacuna:  
Are Iberians counted as White or Hispanic?  And why is Hispanic the 
operative group, as opposed to, e.g., Mexican-Americans or Puerto Ricans?  
Such decisions matter.  Underrepresentation analysis represents a black box 
whose output is only as reliable as the data that goes in.  Furthermore, the 
categories we choose ultimately control who benefits.  By offering a 
numerical formula to select beneficiaries while ignoring these definitional 
issues, the Supreme Court thus artificially separates what are necessarily 
related inquiries.   
Largely ignored by scholars, lower courts have struggled to fill this 
definitional void.  Increasingly confronted with challenges to the racial 
categories that define eligibility, courts have been forced to wrestle with the 
ambiguous nature of racial identities.  Canvassing this hitherto unexplored 
body of case law reveals the many ways in which courts have begun to 
challenge the popular consensus on race.   Such critical scrutiny raises 
concerns that our current racial “map” may be inaccurate and outdated.  At 
the same time, the inconsistent approaches and the conflicting outcomes of 
these cases underscore the inadequacy of current doctrine to deal with this 
fundamental problem.11 
For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that including 
Iberians-Americans like Rocco Luiere in affirmative action violated the 
 
10 The Court did offer some cryptic hints.  See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
4narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.12 Defining a “Hispanic” category 
this way was deemed overinclusive.  Judges in the Eleventh Circuit reached 
the opposite conclusion—on the same question.13 Meanwhile, the Fifth 
Circuit suggested that counting only Mexican-Americans could be 
underinclusive.14 
Our uncertain approach to the Who Question has important real 
world consequences that transcend mere definitional ambiguities.  The 
original beneficiaries of affirmative action, African-Americans, now 
constitute a minority among minorities, while affirmative action benefits 
go—disproportionately15—to newer immigrant groups instead.  Croson’s 
insistence on particularized underrepresentation also penalizes groups such 
as Native Americans whose numbers are often too small to generate 
statistically meaningful evidence.  Conversely, counting with broad 
categories leads to other problems.  For example, because Asians as a whole 
are no longer underrepresented in higher education, Asian subgroups who 
are underrepresented are denied affirmative action.16 
These problems are symptomatic of the larger failure of equality 
discourse to look beyond Black and White and acknowledge the full 
 
12 Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Cook Cty, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). 
13 See Peightal v. Metropolitan. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994).   
14 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 n.37 (5th Cir. 1996). 
15 In 1993, Black-owned construction companies received less than a fifth of federal 
highway set-asides, and in 1996 garnered only a third of the SBA minority business 
funding—less than the share of their proportional representation among US minorities 
would justify and roughly half their share from a decade earlier.  Asian-Americans claimed 
almost as much SBA money as African-Americans despite having half the population.  
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM: COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 164 (2002); see also George 
R. LaNoue, The Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy, 61 ALBANY L. 
REV. 1 (1997) (noting slower growth rate of Black-owned minority businesses compared to 
other minorities will mean continued decline in African-American share of MBE benefits); 
Malamud, supra note xx, at 321 (describing the predominant share of minority scholarships 
going to nonblacks); Graham, supra this note, at 192, 197 (describing how many employers 
have added “diversity” to their workforce by hiring Hispanic or Asian immigrants at the 
expense of African-Americans). 
16 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
5spectrum of ethnic color in America.17 Existing racial taxonomies have 
grown inadequate to deal with the complexities of our diverse population.  
Yet, the paradigmatic role of African-Americans in debates over racial 
equality often masks the ambiguities posed by other groups.18 Meanwhile, 
constitutional discourse on equality operates at a level of abstraction in 
which the Who Question is bypassed entirely.19 
Recently, commentators have begun to look elsewhere for fresh 
ideas on affirmative action.  In particular, India has attracted the attention of 
both leading constitutional law scholars20 and social scientists.21 In contrast 
to the particularized discrimination targeted by Croson, India has explicitly 
adopted a societal approach to affirmative action that Croson rejected.  By 
reconceptualizing affirmative action as a project dedicated to eradicating 
societal hierarchies, India not only illustrates “the path not taken” in the US, 
it offers a working model of the anti-subordination approach to equality 
long advocated by constitutional scholars and critical race theorists.22 
Selecting beneficiaries under this approach becomes an exercise in 
locating patterns of disadvantage.  Intriguingly, India has developed a 
sophisticated methodology to identify subordinated groups through 
 
17 Alex Saragoza, et. al., History and Public Policy: Title VII and the Use of the 
Hispanic Classification, 5 LA RAZA L. J. 1, 4-10 (1992). 
18 Id.; Daniel Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV.
893, 894 (1994); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It’s Not Just Black and 
White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 962-64 (1995).  
19 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1311, 1313 (1999). 
20 E.g. id.; Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary 
Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV 649 (2004). 
21 Clark D. Cunningham, Glenn C. Loury, & John David Skrentny et al., Passing Strict 
Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835 
(2002) [Hereinafter the amicus scholars]; SUNITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE:
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 
(1997). 
22 Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava- Menon, Race, Class, Caste . . .? Rethinking 
Affirmative Action, 97 MICH L. REV. 1296, 1302-1305 (1999); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 
“Our Constitution is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 n.184 (1991). 
6empirical analysis.  India thus illustrates a sociologically targeted answer to 
the Who Question that the US could learn from.23 
A recent amicus brief filed by comparative scholars before the US 
Supreme Court explicitly advocated that the US adopt India’s societal 
approach to the Who Question.24 This Article critiques the amicus scholars’ 
proposal—and, by extension, the broader literature on anti-subordination—
by examining the practical and normative difficulties in implementing such 
a model.  It argues that India’s approach does not provide a workable basis 
to select beneficiaries, nor would it be desirable even if it could.25 
Whereas critical scholars often attribute the “decontextualized” 
reading of racial equality in Supreme Court precedent to ideological 
hostility to race-consciousness,26 this Article will argue that with regard to 
the Who Question the opposite applies.  Pressing the ambiguities of race 
would expose the normative incoherence of affirmative action in a way that 
would prove politically untenable.  The Court therefore deflects the Who 
Question in order to preserve the status quo under which affirmative action 
can continue to function.27 
That said, strict scrutiny does not permit such definitional issues to 
be bypassed entirely.  The Supreme Court’s avoidance of the Who Question 
has led to doctrinal confusion among the lower judiciary.  This Article 
suggests an analytic framework to improve on our current approach.  In this 
regard, it proposes some modest applications of the Indian model, both as a 
 
23 See LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA: DEFINING 
THE DISADVANTAGED (2003); MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE 
BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984). 
24 Brief Amicus Curiae of Social Science and Comparative Law Scholars in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 2000 U.S. Briefs 730 (June 1, 2001).  Three of these scholars 
expanded upon the insights of their brief in a law review article.  Cunningham, Loury, & 
Skrentny, supra note 18.  Citations to “the amicus scholars” will refer to this latter work.   
25 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g. Gotanda, supra note 19, at 46. 
27 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
7definitional tool and as a means of allocating decisional authority to decide 
the “Who Question.”28 
The argument proceeds in four parts.  Part I begins with an overview 
of the ambiguous and contested nature of the racial/ethnic categories and 
presents empirical data demonstrating inconsistencies in the racial 
definitions used in affirmative action.  It then traces the historical origins of 
affirmative action and shows that both the development of race-conscious 
government policies as well as the categories used to implement them 
occurred more in the manner of ad hoc improvisation than through any 
guiding principle or intent.  Part  I next explores how constitutional equality 
law has responded, from the Supreme Court’s agnosticism on the selection 
question to its virtual silence on the definition question, leaving in place a 
popular consensus approach to race by default.  Using US Census data to 
demonstrate the internal heterogeneity of standard racial categories, Part I 
challenges this popular consensus and calls into question their utility for 
allocating affirmative action remedies.  Finally, it demonstrates the 
confusion that has resulted as lower courts have attempted to redefine race 
“functionally” in a manner that comports with the narrow tailoring 
requirements of strict scrutiny.   
Part II then introduces the Indian model as a possible alternative 
approach.  It illustrates how the model might be applied in practice to the 
US context, again using Census data to dissect racial categories socio-
economically by subgroup.  Doing so raises both methodological and 
demographic challenges.  In particular, Part II highlights the uncertain 
connection between immigration and ethnic disadvantage.  Part II also 
explores prudential risks in embracing Indian methodology.  The Who 
Question can be divisive; it can heighten race-consciousness in ways that 
 
28 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
8may have unintended repercussions.  Furthermore, the normative 
incoherency of US affirmative action limits our ability to answer the Who 
Question with any precision.  Forced attempts at clarity might prove 
counterproductive.  Ultimately, Part II argues that the Supreme Court’s 
avoidance of the Who Question rests on a political calculus in which 
ambiguity represents the price of our continued commitment to race-
conscious affirmative action. 
The argument for ambiguity, however, is not absolute.  Part III 
explores the need to strike a balance between competing jurisprudential 
concerns.  Recent case law threatens to make continued avoidance of the 
Who Question untenable.  As lower court begin to take a skeptical look at 
the categories used to allocate affirmative action remedies, the prudential 
tradeoffs between clarity and ambiguity will need to be addressed.  Even if 
India’s model cannot answer our Who Question, it could still help us 
improve on the status quo.  To this end, Part III proposes some practical 
applications of Indian methodology with regard to the definitional issues of 
race:  It argues for a more differentiated analysis of ethnic subgroups and 
local context and encourages consideration of systemic disadvantage as a 
threshold test to improve the categories we count with.  Part III also reflects 
on the meta-question of whether courts should “constitutionalize” the Who 
Question or leave it to political bodies to muddle through.  It considers 
India’s hybrid approach of “bounded discretion” as a possible solution.  
Following Part III, the Article concludes. 
 
9I. Categorical Confusion and Constitutional Silences 
A.  Identities in Flux 
Rocco Luiere’s experience is hardly unique.  The Hispanic 
classification varies across jurisdictions; even within the same region, 
different entities may recognize different groups.29 The definitional 
boundaries of Hispanic-ness have already been litigated in several 
affirmative action contexts, with the inclusion of Iberian-Americans proving 
particularly contentious.30 San Francisco’s Civil Service Commission 
fielded an especially heated debate on the issue.  Advocates of a narrow 
definition argued that, far from being historically oppressed, Spaniards were 
responsible for the destruction of indigenous cultures in Latin America.  
Opponents countered by stressing the historical ties of language and culture 
that Spaniards shared with other Hispanics.31 The two sides also disputed 
the extent to which Iberians experience the same discriminatory animus 
directed against Latinos. The anti-Iberian camp contended that the paler 
complexion and European features of Iberians allowed them to blend in 
with the White majority.  Iberian defenders emphasized characteristic 
accents and surnames that mark Iberians as Hispanic and expose them to 
prejudice.32 
29 See Table I (illustrating variation in Hispanic definitions across jurisdictions).  The 
data presented are drawn primarily from a survey of municipal MBE programs conducted 
in 2004 by and on file with the author.   
30 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
31 Alex Saragoza, et. al., supra note xx, at 2.   
32 This argument had prevailed a decade earlier when Iberian contractors successfully 
lobbied for inclusion in federal affirmative action set-asides.  Prior to that point, the 
Hispanic category had generally been thought of as including Europeans.  See infra notes 
xxx and accompanying text. 
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Nor are Hispanics the only affirmative action group to inspire such 
definitional debates.  The boundaries of the “Asian Pacific” classification 
are equally variable and contested.33 Ohio courts fielded a flurry of 
litigation when the state MBE program decided that contractors from India 
and Lebanon no longer qualified.  The case of Lebanese-American 
contractor Nadim Ritchey went all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court.  (He 
lost).34 Oregon administrators wrestled with similar ambiguity when a 
Kazakhstani contractor claimed eligibility.35 
Even African-American has become a contested category.  
Commentators have questioned whether Black immigrants should qualify 
for affirmative action.  This debate was fueled by recent studies showing 
 
33 Formal definitions of the “Asian” category vary widely.  Some exclude 
Subcontinental Asians or Filipinos; others out leave Pacific Islanders and/or Native 
Hawaiians.  Some include Afghanis; the city of Charlotte also included Persians.  See 
McGowan, supra note xx, at 130; George LaNoue, Standards for the Second Generation of 
Croson-Inspired Studies, 26 URBAN LAWYER 485, 491 (1994). 
34 Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871, 927 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1999).  The 
federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had the last laugh, however, striking down the entire 
MBE program as unconstitutional.  Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 
730 (6th Cir. 2000). 
35 Telephone Interview with Jill Miller, Certification Specialist, Oregon Office of 
Minority, Women, & Emerging Small Business, Portland, Oregon (May 27, 2004).   
Name of Jurisdiction Spaniards Portuguese Other Latin American
Atlanta No No Yes
Baltimore Yes Yes Yes
Boston No No Yes
Miami Yes Yes Yes
New York No No Yes
Oakland* Yes No Yes
Richmond* Yes No Yes
San Francisco* No No Yes
San Jose* No No Yes
Small Business Administration Yes Yes Yes
US Census** Yes No Yes
Stanford University No No Only Mexican-American and Puerto Rican
Univ. of Texas+ No No Only Mexican-American
* Pre 1996
+ Pre 1995
** US Census treats Hispanic classification as an 
ethnic identity independent of its racial categories
Table I - Who is Hispanic?
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that 40% of African-American students admitted at Harvard and other elite 
universities were immigrants or children of immigrants.36 Studies have also 
shown that employers in New York City are much more willing to hire 
Jamaicans and Africans than non-immigrant Blacks.37 “African-ness” is 
itself contested.  Teresa Heinz Kerry faced ridicule for implying that her 
(Caucasian) Africaner heritage made her “African-American.”38 Yet, racial 
distinctions in Africa are not always so clear-cut.  Affirmative action 
programs typically define Black Americans in circular fashion as descended 
from “black racial groups.”39 MBE programs have therefore struggled to 
decide whether Sudanese and Ethiopians qualify as “Black.”40 
Meanwhile, other ethnic groups currently classified as White have 
sought “minority” status in part to gain inclusion in affirmative action.  
While Middle-Eastern-Americans lobbied unsuccessfully for census 
recognition in 2000, they did win eligibility for affirmative action in San 
Francisco.  French-Acadians were eligible in Louisiana.  City University of 
New York at one point recognized Italian-Americans.41 Congress 
championed rural Appalachian Whites as equally deserving.42 And while 
Hasidic Jews failed to win recognition from the Small Business 
Administration (SBA), they are included in other federal affirmative action 
 
36 Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which Ones,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004 at A1. 
37 See Jennifer Lee, The Racial and Ethnic Meaning Behind Black, in John David 
Skrentny, ed., COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 184 (2001) [Hereinafter, Color Lines]. 
38 Maureen Dowd, Out of Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at 14. 
39 E.g. 49 C.F.R. pt. 26 (199); 13 C.F.R. 124.103. 
40 Interview with Hayden Lee, supra note xx.  Cf. The World Notices Darfur, THE 
ECONOMIST, July 31, 2004, at 39 (describing racial ambiguities in Darfur). 
41 DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING “RACE” AND “ETHNICITY” IN AMERICA 67 (2003). 
42 See George LaNoue & John Sullivan, Presumptions for Preferences: The Small 
Business Administration’s Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action, 6 J. POL’Y
HIST. 439, 443 (1994) [hereinafter Presumptions] (describing legislative history to 
Congressional authorization of federal MBE program).  
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contexts.43 
As America’s population grows ever more diverse, such categorical 
conundrums will continue to multiply.  At root lies the simple fact that race 
and ethnicity are not biological absolutes, but social constructions whose 
contours are amorphous, contingent, and inherently contestable.44 As one 
court summarized: “Race is politics, not biology.”45 It may be tempting to 
dismiss such definitional disputes as the normal cut and thrust of identity 
politics. Yet, as Rocco Luiere reminds us, there are tangible benefits at 
stake on which people’s livelihoods depend.  Administrators of affirmative 
action programs have to wrestle with the uncertainties and ambiguities of 
race to determine who’s in . . . and who’s out.   
Increasingly, such disputes are finding their way into the courts.  If 
you’re a judge assigned to such a case, how do you decide?  What does it 
mean, e.g., to be “Hispanic” for purposes of affirmative action?  Faced with 
such questions, courts have tried all manner of approaches:  They have 
consulted dictionaries46 and turned to legislative history.47 Some treat 
“Hispanic” as a question of ancestry; others stress language, culture,48 
43 Compare  LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions at 449, with Congressional Research 
Service, COMPILATION AND OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
ESTABLISHING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS (1995) (citing 48 C.F.R. § 2426.101 (1994).  
Hasidic Jews were also eligible for other SBA programs at some point.  LaNoue & 
Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xx, at 461.   
44 The idea that humanity can be classified into biological substrata based on 
phenotypic attributes has long ago been discredited.  See Houston Contractors Ass’n v. 
Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris County, 993 F. Supp. 545, 546 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Ian F. 
Haney López, The Social Construction of Race, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).  
Even if a new understanding of “scientific race” should emerge from our exploration of the 
human genome, the particular color lines drawn in the US are more likely to reflect our 
own contingent history.   
45 Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 546. 
46 Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871, 927 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1999). 
47 St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987) (defining race in part 
based on popular understandings at the time Section 1981 was enacted).  
48 Lagrua v. Ward, 519 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
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history,49 discrimination,50 or even physical appearance.51 For some courts, 
defining the boundaries of “Hispanic” is like asking where blue ends and 
green begins; they dismiss the category as meaningless.52 
As noted, courts have reached inconsistent rulings regarding 
affirmative action eligibility.  If you read these opinions, there seems little 
driving them besides the judges’ underlying intuitions.  Judge Posner states 
flatly that Iberians haven’t been victims of discrimination and challenges 
the defendant to produce evidence to the contrary.53 The Eleventh Circuit 
reverses the burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to prove that Iberians 
don’t belong.54 Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit simply assumes the 
underinclusiveness of Mexican-Americans is self-explanatory.   
What is clear about these cases is that we don’t have a good way to 
answer the Who Question.  Indeed, the Who Question has been conspicuous 
by its absence from affirmative action discourse.55 African-Americans are 
increasingly losing out to newer immigrant groups with no history of de 
jure discrimination.56 Yet, we continue to view affirmative action almost 
 
49 Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
50 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954). 
51 Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3rd Cir. 1991) .  See also 
Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1408-09 (11th Cir. 1991) (opinion of 
Judge Brown). 
52 Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1069 n.17 (D. Ct. 
Colo. 2000) (describing Hispanic as an inherently indeterminate category for which “there 
is no agreed working definition”); Alen v. State, 596 So.2d 1083, 1084-85 (Ct. App. Fl. 
1992) (questioning whether Hispanics constitute a judicially cognizable ethnic group for 
jury selection purposes). 
53 Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647. 
54 Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1164. 
55 Most debate focuses on whether racial preferences in general are morally or 
constitutional defensible.  More recently, commentators have questioned whether such 
policies actually work as intended—Compare Richard Sanders, A Systemic Analysis of 
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. Rev. 367 (2004) (arguing that 
affirmative action harms beneficiaries by promoting them beyond their abilities), with 
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, SHAPE OF THE RIVER (2004) (contrary view).  
56 See supra note 17. 
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exclusively in Black and White terms, with other groups acknowledged—if 
at all—through vague euphemisms such as “people of color.”     
Whether you agree or disagree with affirmative action, the fact is it 
exists—we’re doing it.  So why don’t we question which groups get 
included?  Are we avoiding the Who Question because talking about race 
makes us uncomfortable?  Are we afraid of seeming politically incorrect?  
Is it intellectual laziness?  Bureaucratic inertia?  Or are there deeper, 
perhaps more principled reasons that underpin our current laissez faire 
approach?  To answer these questions, we need to understand how 
affirmative action began and how we inherited the racial categories we 
have.    
B. Unholy Genesis:  The Quadrangle in Historical Context 
The modern era of race consciousness in government policy 
emerged as an outgrowth of the civil rights movement.  Beginning with 
early efforts to promote equal opportunity and evolving into outright racial 
quotas, the federal government increasingly began to design social policy 
around race.  Although the US Census had kept statistics on race for over a 
century using varying categories, federal agencies suddenly had a need to 
collect detailed racial data across a wide range of contexts.  Federal 
statisticians therefore devised new standardized categories to record such 
data.  To some extent, the categories devised by federal statisticians for 
such purposes tracked preexisting markers of identity—the “classic color 
codes” of an earlier era of de jure racism.57 However, as US residents 
became accustomed to checking off boxes classifying themselves as White, 
Black, Asian, Indian, or Hispanic, a new popular consensus emerged around 
this national blueprint on race.58 Moreover, the “classic color codes” soon 
 
57 David A. Hollinger, Group Preferences, Cultural Diversity, and Social Democracy: 
Notes Toward a Theory of Affirmative Action, in 55 REPRESENTATIONS 31, 33 (1996). 
58 Id. 
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expanded to “color in” all sorts of new immigrant groups whose racial 
identities may have been ambiguous upon arrival (and occasionally 
“recolored” existing groups).   
Prior to this time, the boundaries of race had remained ill-defined 
and were often regionally specific.59 Conceptions of race continued to 
evolve as ethnic minorities such as “Jews” and “Irish,” initially stigmatized 
as racial outsiders, gradually assimilated into the White “majority.”60 Thus, 
as Justice Powell observes in Bakke, “[t]he concepts of ‘majority’ and 
‘minority’ necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political 
judgments.”61 
This process of racial redefinition continues today.  The 2000 
Census’ decision to recognize a new “Pacific Islander” category augurs the 
birth of a distinct racial identity, and lobbying continues for an as-yet 
unrecognized “Middle-Eastern-American” grouping.62 What is different 
now is the stakes that attach to such categorical definitions.  In the age of 
identity politics, race offers a powerful mobilizing strategy to gain political 
influence and extract government rents.63 Yet, despite such tangible stakes 
in the “market for identities,” the construction of racial identities has been 
 
59 Graham, supra note xx, at 40, 42.  Thus, the Irish in Boston were often treated worse 
than Negroes, but less ostracized elsewhere.  Similar focal-points of hostility faced, e.g. 
Mexicans in Texas and Chinese in California.  Id. 
60 See NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); St. Francis, 481 U.S. 
at 610 (“Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of 
the same race [in the 19th century]”). 
61 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295. 
62 YANOW, supra note xx, at 39-40.   
63 The tangible benefits attached to “minority status” help to explain the reverse 
trajectory which racial redefinitions now follows.  In the old “melting pot” model, ethnic 
immigrants (mostly European) shed their racialized “otherness” to blend into the 
undifferentiated mass of hyphenated-Americans we now label “White.”  Today, ethnic 
groups such as Mexicans and South Asians who formerly claimed “White” identities now 
consciously espouse identities of “color.”  A similar attempt at redefinition is in process for 
Arab-Americans.  With affirmative action hinging on minority status, “Whiteness” has 
become devalued in the “market for identities,” and supply has adjusted to meet demand. 
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mediated through obscure bureaucratic processes operating largely outside 
the public eye.64  
Several recent studies have shed light on the historical genesis of our 
current racial consensus.65 Three main themes emerge:  First, the categories 
we use were created in largely ad hoc fashion without study or debate.  
Second, once established, the standardized definitions were blindly 
propagated without further inquiry.  Third, while the original categories 
centered on groups with undeniable histories of persecution, they soon 
expanded to embrace newer immigrant groups with more tenuous claims to 
inclusion.   
Like the Civil Rights Movement from which it sprang, affirmative 
action initially focused on redress for one group, African-Americans, 
reflecting the moral imperative of slavery and Segregation.66 Not only did 
African-Americans present the most compelling claim to racial justice, for 
all intents and purposes, they were the only racial minority of national 
significance.67 
Nonetheless, federal policy-makers were soon persuaded by 
Hispanic and Asian leaders to bring their groups under federal protection.68 
An 1956 guideline for gathering racial statistics on employment and 
 
64 See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 140. 
65 See LaNoue, Presumptions, supra note xx; GRAHAM, supra note xx; JOHN DAVID 
SKRENTNY: MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002). 
66 Lyndon Johnson famously justified affirmative action by evoking the imagery of 
slavery.  “You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate 
him, bring up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all 
the others.’”  Graham, supra note xx, at 77.  In this sense, affirmative action can be seen as 
yet another milestone in a progression of political reforms animated by concern over 
African-Americans from the Thirteenth Amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Id. at 
143-44, 173. 
67 David Lauter, Minorities Adding up to a Majority, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), 
April 12, 1995 at E1.  Other groups were mostly limited to a regional presence—Chinese 
and Japanese-Americans on the West Coast, Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, and 
Puerto-Ricans in the Northeast.  GRAHAM, supra note xx at 104. 
68 Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 860-61. 
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contracting suggested “Spanish-American,” “Oriental,” “Indian,” “Jewish,” 
and “Puerto-Rican” as categories.69 The 1962 “Standard Form 40” dropped 
Jews and combined Puerto-Ricans with other Spanish-Americans.  Widely 
copied, the form constituted a quasi-official standard propagated throughout 
the federal government in a variety of contexts.70 
The process of determining who made it onto these lists and who got 
left out was largely left to mid-level civil servants acting with little or no 
policy guidance.  They made almost no effort to elicit public input, or 
examine empirical data, or rely on any sort of “scientific” selection 
process.71 Instead, categories were chosen in essentially ad hoc fashion, 
with little thought as to their long-term consequences.72 
Once the lists were created, the groups included quickly assumed the 
status of “official” minorities,73 an ethno-racial “quadrangle” comprised of 
Blacks, Hispanics, Indians, and Asians.  The Hispanic category, in 
particular, crystallized a new popular understanding of race.  The Mexican-
Americans of the American South-West, the Northeast’s Puerto Ricans, and 
Florida’s Cubans had rarely thought of themselves, or been thought of by 
others as constituting a single group until somebody decided to lump them 
into single statistical category of “Spanish-Americans,”74 Political 
 
69 SKRENTNY, supra note xx. 
70 Graham describes how Standard Form 40 begat the EEOC’s 1965 EEO-1, which 
required employers nationwide to count heads using the same four categories.  The EEO-1 
in turn served as the basis for the four groups singled out for preference under the 197_ 
Philadelphia Plan and the 1973 SBA 8(a) Program.  GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 137-139.  
By 1980, the Office of Management & Budget (OMB)’s  Directive No. 15 had made these 
standard groupings mandatory for all federal agencies gathering statistics based on race.  
YANOW, supra note xxx at 37. 
71 LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx. 
72GRAHAM, supra note xxx at 134, 136.  The choices were also partly influenced by 
instrumental constraints.  For example, EEOC categories were intended to be used by 
employers classifying their workforce through visual inspection.  White ethnic groups, who 
would be more to difficult to distinguish visually, were not included partly for this reason.  
Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 862-63.  
73 Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 859-867. 
74 Id. at 879 n.258.  The artificiality of this new grouping was underlined by the initial 
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considerations also factored into these categorical choices, as with the 
Nixon White House’s lobbying to include Cubans in the nascent Hispanic 
category to curry favor with this loyal bloc of Republican voters.75 
The stakes attached to such categorical machinations rose 
dramatically following the 1960s race riots when “soft” affirmative action 
focused on ensuring equal opportunity hardened into overt racial 
preferences.76 With race now used explicitly to allocate government 
resources, it suddenly mattered more who was included among the favored 
groups.  As Black Americans were the main protagonists in the riots, they 
were the universal focus of efforts at redress.77 Yet, the other designated 
“minorities” found themselves included in federal remedies as well since no 
one wanted to undertake the contentious task of selecting between them.78 
Existing category definitions thus past seamlessly into this new context, and 
the definition question answered the selection question by default.  
As preferential programs continued to proliferate in a diversity of 
contexts, the categories of the quadrangle went with them, with no one 
 
confusion as to what to call it:  Spanish-Americans, Spanish-Speaking Americans, and 
Spanish-Surnamed Americans all vied for contention (each of which, taken literally, would 
embrace slightly different constituencies).  Moreover, Puerto Ricans remained excluded 
from early definitions of this group.  Only in 1976 was the category rechristened 
“Hispanic.”  GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 139 n.16. 
75 George LaNoue & John Sullivan, Deconstructing the Affirmative Action Categories,
41 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 913, 915 (1998).  The Cuban community at that 
time was composed primarily of wealthy exiles, predominantly of European extraction, 
who had fled Castro’s expropriations.  Id.  Conversely, the omission of Jews seems to have 
been prompted in large part by opposition from African-Americans. GRAHAM, supra note 
xx, at 137; La Noue, Presumptions, note xx. 
76 Such riots persuaded government and industry leaders that rapid hiring of African-
Americans was to be the price of racial peace.  Racial preferences were the logical tool.  
GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 137-38, 173. 
77 The 1967 Kerner Commission investigating the race riots concluded that “special 
encouragement” was needed to guide Blacks into the economic mainstream.  No other 
groups were discussed.  LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx at 442.  
Similarly, the Labor Department held hearings in 1969 to document discrimination against 
Black workers to justify its “Philadelphia Plan” for racially preferential hiring.  No record 
was made of discrimination against other minority group at the hearings.  GRAHAM, supra 
note xx, at 139. 
78 LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xx, at 440, 443. 
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bothering to reinvent the definitional wheel.79 Local governments had a 
built-in incentive to adhere to federal standards as they were obliged to use 
federally-recognized categories on project receiving federally funds.80 
However, while the standard categories have remained largely fixed 
since the 1960s, the groups included within these categories have expanded 
over time.  Once the category of “Spanish-Speaking Americans” was 
renamed “Hispanic,” it expanded to include groups such as Brazilians who 
don’t even speak Spanish.81 While Mexican- and Puerto Rican-Americans 
had the main historical claims to redress, once Nixon let in Cubans, other 
Latin-Americans simply rode their coattails.  Even Spaniards and 
Portuguese—initially regarded as “Europeans”—successfully lobbied for 
federal reclassification as “Hispanic.”82 
Similarly, the “Oriental” category began with a focus on Japanese- 
and Chinese-Americans as the main victims of historical discrimination in 
the US.  Rebranded as “Asian,” the category rapidly expanded to include 
other East and Southeast Asians as well as a broad swath of the South 
Pacific before veering westward to envelop “Subcontinental Asians.”  
This steady inflation of existing categories has been largely driven 
by immigration.83 The Asian Pacific Islander (API) category, for example, 
 
79 LaNoue & Sullivan, Deconstructing, supra note xx, at 914.  Almost every federal 
agency has its own form of affirmative action—from the Defense Department to the 
Environmental Protection Agency—and virtually all adhere to the quadrangle.  See 
Congressional Research Service, COMPILATION AND OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS ESTABLISHING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS OR OTHER PREFERENCES 
BASED ON RACE, GENDER, OR ETHNICITY, February 17, 1995 (providing comprehensive 
list of federal affirmative action programs). 
80 It makes sense to use federal categories even when administering purely local 
programs to avoid duplication of standards and enable reciprocity in MBE certifications. 
81 See Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1094 (Ct. App. Fl. 1992) (noting the South 
American “Hispanics” can also be from Belize, and British and French Guyana—none of 
which speak Spanish or Portuguese); see also GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 191 (questioning 
inclusion of Belize, Surinam, Guiana as non-Spanish speaking nations).   
82 49 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1999). 
83 GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 95.  The 1965 Immigration Act paved the way for a 
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now embraces almost half the world’s population.  Lacking a history of 
persecution in the US, the new “immigrants of color” justified their 
inclusion by claiming a racial kinship that allowed them to assimilate into 
existing categories.84 Acceptance of such claims has been largely “a matter 
of bureaucratic convenience rather than careful ethnographic analysis.”85 
Its main premise seems to have been proximity of geographic origin.  In 
what other sense can Samoans be said to be ethnically “like” Chinese?  Or 
Vietnamese “related to” Pakistanis?   
Such putative commonalities tells us nothing about whether and how 
these groups have experienced racial disadvantages in the US, which was 
the standard that the SBA had ostensibly established for eligibility in 
affirmative action.  As the central arbiter of these categorical redefinitions, 
the SBA made no effort to independently examine actual evidence of US 
disadvantage.86 As a result, the application of its stated criteria smacked of 
double standards.  It turned down Persian-Americans who had demonstrated 
undeniable evidence of racial prejudice on the ground that the record 
presented was insufficiently “longstanding,”87 while letting in others, such 
as Tongans, who made even less of a showing.88 Moreover, the SBA 
designated as “disadvantaged” Asian Indians, “one of the best-educated and 
 
massive influx of immigrants from the developing world.  Two decades later, African-
Americans had gone from being the overwhelming majority of America’s nonwhite 
population to become a minority among minorities.  Id. 
84 LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx at 460. 
85 Id. at 459. 
86 LaNoue, Presumptions, at 451, 463.  The SBA seems to have paid little attention to 
relevant data even when presented as part of a petition.  Id. at 450 (observing that data on 
business ownership and revenues included in the petition by Asian Indians did not 
demonstrate disadvantage, but rather the opposite). 
87 Id. at 456 (citing evidence of fervent anti-Persian sentiment in the aftermath of the 
Iran Hostage Crisis). 
88 A 1986 petition by Tongans admitted that—far from facing discrimination—“the 
main reason for their social disadvantage was ‘[their] general lack of the English language’ 
because many Tongan immigrants were older and had difficulty learning English.”  
LaNoue & Sullivan, supra note xxx, at 453.   
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most prosperous groups in the country” and previously regarded as 
Caucasian.89 
Once the petition by Indians was approved, the SBA let in other 
“Subcontinental Asians” without even being asked.90 Letting in Pakistanis 
because they are “like” Indians raises the inevitable question:  Why not 
Afghanis or Persians?  Fearing such a domino effect of geographic 
extrapolations, the SBA drew an arbitrary line at the Khyber Pass.  On one 
side of the line, Pakistani-Americans are considered racially “Asian” and 
hence “disadvantaged.”  On the other, Persians and Afghani-Americans are 
relegated to “Whiteness” and presumptively ineligible for affirmative 
action—a distinction to which almost all affirmative action programs 
continue to adhere.  No findings were ever made to justify this abrupt—and 
etymologically perverse91—termination of “Asia Pacifica” in mid-
Continent.92 
The trial judge hearing Lebanese contractor Nadim Ritchey’s 
challenge to Ohio’s MBE program found this truncated geography 
preposterous.   
Working our way north and west from India we first come to 
Pakistan, then Iran, the Iraq, then Syria, and finally Lebanon.  If 
Asian Indians are “Oriental,” shall we exclude Pakistanis separated 
from India only by the Great Indian Desert? And if Pakistanis are 
“Oriental,” shall we exclude Iranians who share a common border 
with Pakistan? And if Iran, is “Oriental,” shall we exclude Iraq 
separated from Iran only by the Zagros Mountains? And if Iraq is 
“Oriental,” shall we exclude Syria for the Euphrates River flows 
 
89 Id. at 451. 
90 LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx at 452. 
91 The continent of Asia originally obtained its name from the Roman province of Asia 
in modern Turkey, which today falls on the wrong side of the SBA’s line.  John Richards, 
Recent Patent Law Developments in Asia, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
599 (1997). 
92 LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx. 
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through both countries? And finally if Syria is “Oriental,” how can 
its contiguous neighbor Lebanon be anything but Oriental.93 
Accordingly, the court held Ohio’s affirmative action statute 
unconstitutional, declaring it “repugnant to our constitutional system of 
government [to] exclude a group of United States citizens . . . [solely based 
on] the side of a river, a mountain range, or a desert their ancestor decided 
to settle.”94 
The court’s logic is superficially appealing, but it relies on the same 
logic of proximity that got the SBA into trouble.  It is difficult to see where 
it would end.  Regardless how you define it, race/ethnicity is not a 
geographically discrete phenomenon.  “The [human] species is not divided 
into exclusive genetically distinct, homogenous groupings similar to 
subspecies, as the concept of “race” implies.  All human groups share many 
features with other groups, and it is impossible to draw rigid boundaries 
around them.”95 
Arguably, both the Ohio court and the SBA were looking at the 
problem the wrong way.  Affirmative action definitions should not hinge on 
global ethnography but rather should reflect the sociological meaning of 
race and ethnicity as phenomena in the US, as the SBA own stated criteria 
had proclaimed.  If so, how are we to interpret this racial meaning, let alone 
identify it in particular cases?  As we have seen, the SBA and other political 
actors have evaded the Who Question, propagating existing racial categories 
blindly and expanding their constituencies for reasons more of bureaucratic 
expediency than principle.  As the next section illustrates, the Supreme 
Court has proven just as unwilling to undertake the challenge. 
 
93 Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997) (cited in LaNoue, supra note XX). 
94 Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d. 871, 878 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1997). 
95 Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 551; see also Haney López, supra [Social 
Construction of Race]. 
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C. What the Supreme Court Hasn’t Told Us 
Preferential affirmative action began in an atmosphere of racial 
crisis with little unifying vision beyond the perceived need for action.96 
Over time, the original focus on remedying historical injustice expanded to 
embrace other objectives.  Yet, while courts have said a lot about why we 
can do affirmative action (which rationales count as constitutionally 
compelling) and how we can do it (preferably not via quotas), they have 
said very little about who gets included.   
The Who Question initially appeared uncontroversial because only 
one group was contemplated as the beneficiary of affirmative action:  
African-Americans.  As Justice Marshall argued in Bakke, “[t]he experience 
of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from 
that of other ethnic groups.  It is not merely the history of slavery alone but 
also that of a whole people marked as inferior by the law.”97 
However, while African-Americans remain the paradigmatic 
beneficiaries, an increasing share of the affirmative action pie has gone to 
other groups with less well-documented histories of societal prejudice.98 
Moreover, since almost every ethnic group has suffered at least some 
discrimination at some point, choosing between them is problematic. 
Justice Powell saw this as an intractable challenge.  The United 
States, he argued in Bakke, “ha[s] become a Nation of minorities,” in which 
even the so-called “ ‘majority’ is composed of various minority groups, 
most of whom can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination.”99 
96 JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); GRAHAM,
supra note xx, at 137-38. 
97 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
98 See supra note xx. 
99 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295. 
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He saw no principled basis to prioritize their competing claims to 
remedial justice.  “The kind of variable sociological and political analysis 
necessary . . . simply does not lie within the judicial competence.”100 
Justice O’Connor in Croson similarly bemoaned the impossibility of 
selecting between “inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.”101 
Partly because of such difficulties, the Supreme Court has rejected 
societal discrimination as “too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially 
classified remedy.”102 The inability to trace causal links between injury and 
effects and to precisely calibrate a remedy raises the “danger that a racial 
classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of 
racial politics.”103 Fearful that societal justifications will thus be used to 
legitimize demands for outright racial balancing, the Court has held that 
only identified discrimination in a particularized context can serve to justify 
a racial remedy.104 
By reconceiving racism as discrete acts of prejudice in a limited 
context, the Court avoids having to grapple with the broader societal 
significance of race.105 Furthermore, Croson’s prescribed means to identify 
such discrimination distances the Court even further.    Croson held that 
cities could create an inference of unlawful discrimination by demonstrating 
a significant disparity between the availability of qualified minority-owned 
 
100 Id. at 297; see also De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(noting the theoretical difficulties in evaluating competing claims of minority groups). 
101 Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.  Without a requirement of particularized evidence, Justice 
O’Connor feared that “our history will adequately support a legislative preference for 
almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political strength to negotiate ‘a piece 
of the action’ for its members.”  Id. at 510-511. 
102 Id. at 497 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); id. at 506 (for the Court).   
103 Id. at 510 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).  “In the absence of particularized findings, a 
court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in 
their ability to affect the future.”  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 276 
(1986). 
104 Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.  
105 Cf. Gotanda, supra note xx, at 43-44. 
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firms and the share of city contracts awarded to such firms.106 The 
methodology of disparity testing supplants a messy sociological inquiry 
with the seemingly objective comfort of statistical analysis.107 The Court 
no longer has to choose between groups because the numbers will do the 
job for it. 
In Bakke, Justice Powell introduced a second rationale for 
affirmative action: promoting educational diversity.108 Eschewing racial 
quotas, Powell insisted that consideration of race in this context be limited 
to “a plus factor” weighed in a holistic assessment of each individual 
applicant.109 Focusing on individual applicants again moves away from the 
broader societal relevance of race.  Moreover, by deferring on first 
amendment grounds to the right of universities to weigh the educational 
value of the viewpoints such applicants bring, the Court remains agnostic as 
to who would qualify under such a regime.110 
In both cases, the Court’s solution focuses on underrepresentation.  
Croson established an intricate methodology to calculate such 
underrepresentation in contracting.  Likewise, Justice Powell makes a point 
of distinguishing between Harvard’s flexible, individualized assessments 
(good) from U.C. Davis’ overly rigid, numerical quotas (bad).111 Both thus 
go to some lengths to establish ground rules by which to count correctly.  
 
106 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-03, 509.  Croson makes clear that disparities can only 
legitimize the use of racial preferences in extreme cases, as last resort.  However, lower 
courts vary in the extent to which they demand race-neutral alternative be explored first.   
107 Statistical disparities are not the only evidence such studies evaluate.  Anecdotal 
testimony about discrimination, history evidence, and social context may all be considered. 
However, statistical disparities represent the only “hard” evidence, and courts generally 
regard them as a sine qua non.
108 Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke received the imprimatur of the full Court in 
Grutter. 539 U.S. at 325.  
109 Bakke, 238 U.S. at 318. 
110 See id. at 312-313; Richard Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre 
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 498 (1993). 
111 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (reiterating distinction in University of Michigan cases).   
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EEOC reporting requirements likewise force employers to pay attention to 
racial balance, many of whom voluntarily undertake affirmative action to 
increase minority representation.112 Measuring group representation—or 
counting heads—has thus become our default way of answering the Who 
Question.  Although the context and process by which such counting occurs 
vary, the numbers game is pervasive.  To answer the Who Question, we 
have to count. 
But who are we counting?  Which minority groups do we look at?  
How do we define them?  Croson doesn’t tell us.  It answers the selection 
question by reference to statistics, but ignores the definition question of 
which statistics to gather.  Similarly, Bakke accepts race as a proxy for 
viewpoint yet leaves open how underrepresented “racial” views are to be 
identified.  Bakke and Croson thus both offer frameworks to select 
affirmative action beneficiaries by race while ignoring the definitional 
question of what race actually is.113 
Despite a vast body of case law on discrimination, there is 
surprisingly little law defining “race.”  One leading case, St. Francis 
College v. Al-Khazraji, defined “race” as an “identifiable class[ ] of persons 
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their 
ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”114 Yet, America is full of ethnic and 
 
112 See Deborah Malamud, Affirmative Action and Ethnic Niches, in Skrenty, COLOR 
LINES, supra note xx at 318 (explaining how employers have incentive to maintain racial 
parity to preempt discrimination claims). 
113 This ambiguity proved controversial when the SBA excluded Hasidic Jews from 
federal affirmative action on the ground that the Hasids were a religious group and not an 
ethnicity. See LaNoue & Sullivan, supra note xxx, at 449.  
114 St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (interpreting race in 
context of section 1981).  See also Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d at154, 173 (3rd 
Cir. 1991) (describing racial discrimination as based on stereotypes regarding identifiable 
groups with shared physical or cultural traits ascribed to a common ancestry). 
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national origin groups that meet this definition.115 It would be impractical to 
count them all, but how do we choose between them?116 
D. Beyond Consensus: An Empirical Assessment of the 
Quadrangle 
For some, the answer to this unanswered question will seem 
obvious.  We all have an intuitive idea who the “minorities” in this country 
are.  The ethno-racial quadrangle is embedded in our national 
consciousness.117 Courts have explicitly defended such a “popular 
consensus” approach to the Who Question, arguing that race is best 
understood as “a matter of practice or attitude in the community.”118 
Choosing affirmative action categories that reflect such conventions also 
accords with a long line of Supreme Court cases that have defined race 
according to a “popular belief” standard.119 
However, to say that the categories used in affirmative action 
“reflect” a popular consensus may be to get the causality reversed.  As we 
saw, the federal government’s establishment of formal categories for race 
itself helped to manufacture the current consensus on race.  Over time, the 
ubiquity of such standard groupings may have reinforced this popular 
consensus, as has active campaigning by identity group lobbies.120 
115 The US Bureau of Census counts at least 630 established ethnic groups.  Students in 
New York City School District 23 alone converse in some 83 different languages.  See 
LaNoue, Presumptions & Sullivan, supra note xxx, at 439. 
116 We might limit our counting only to “minorities.”  But who exactly are they?  To 
answer “non-Whites” only begs the question:  Who is White?  Furthermore, unless we 
lump all “minorities” together, we would still have to have some way of defining 
boundaries between them. 
117 Hollinger, supra note xx, at 33. 
118 Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561 n.25.   
119 IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996) (re: naturalization cases); St. Francis, 481 U.S. at 610 (defining race based on 
popular understanding when Section 1981 was enacted). 
120 See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 144. 
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Nonetheless, the question remains whether this consensus is backed by 
underlying reality.   
Commentators have expressed skepticism.  George La Noue 
suggests “these categories are merely bureaucratic conveniences around 
which political constituencies have been constructed.”121 The comparative 
scholars behind the amicus brief referenced above similarly dismiss the 
quadrangle as “based on a mixture of inadequately examined folk categories 
and interest group politics.”122 
Empirical information is hard to come by.  Most studies of race 
work within the standardized categories and fail to account for intra-group 
differences.  Yet, the US Census does collect some data on racial 
subgroups.  Such evidence reveals considerable variation within the broad 
categories of the quadrangle.  Across a wide array of socio-economic 
indicators, the differences within the main racial groups appear as great as 
those between them.   
Such internal variance is particularly striking within the Asian and 
Hispanic categories.  Across the board, the “top performers” score well 
above the US average, while those at the bottom measure well below the 
US mainstream.  For example, Asian Indian-, Chinese-, and Japanese-
Americans earn almost bachelors degrees at almost double the US average, 
and their success at the graduate level is even more extreme—almost 
quadruple the US average for Indian-Americans.123 Twice as many Indian-
Americans occupy managerial or professional positions as the US norm, 
with Chinese and Japanese also well above the norm.  These groups’ homes 
are valued at double the US median.  By contrast, Cambodian-, Laotian-, 
 
121 LaNoue & Sullivan, Deconstructing, supra note xxx at 917. 
122 Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 879. 
123 See Table II for Asian census data.  For a comparable analysis of Hispanic 
subgroups, see infra notes xxx and Table III.   
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Samoan-, and Tongan-Americans show statistics that present almost the 
reciprocal image of their East and South Asian compatriots.124 Cambodian-
Americans garner half as many BAs and a quarter the number of graduate 
degrees as the US average, their representation among the professional class 
is also half the US rate, and their poverty rate more than double.  Laotians, 
Samoans and Tongans fare only slightly better.     
 
Such intra-group differences call into question the statistical 
inferences of discrimination on which Croson is premised, by potentially 
skewing the data used in disparity analyses.  For example, consider the 
variation in business formation rates among Asian-Americans (a key 
variable in disparity analyses):  Koreans have the highest business 
formation rate of any ethnic group, while Laotians have the lowest.125 If 
you’re doing a disparity study that lumps these groups together, the 
conclusions you reach based on numbers alone may not tell you much.   
 
124 In terms of socio-economic disadvantage, Southeast Asians and Pacific Islanders 
thus stand much closer to African-Americans than to the “model minority” stereotype 
associated with the Asian group overall. 
125 See LaNoue & Sullivan, Deconstructing, supra note xxx at  913. 
Occupation Property Income
Managerial or Median Home %  below
Population Group Bachelors Graduate Professional Value Poverty Level
ALL US 15.5% 8.8% 33.6% $119,600 12.4%
ASIANS 26.7% 17.3% 44.6% $199,300 12.6%
 Asian Indian 29.6% 34.3% 59.9% $210,200 9.8%
 Japanese 28.7% 13.1% 50.6% $238,300 9.7%
 Chinese 24.1% 23.8% 52.2% $232,200 13.5%
 Koreans 29.1% 14.6% 38.7% $209,500 14.8%
 Vietnamese 14.5% 4.8% 26.9% $151,400 16.0%
 Samoan* 7.5% 3.0% 18.6% $153,200 20.2%
 Tongan* 7.3% 1.3% 13.3% $149,100 19.5%
 Laotians 6.3% 1.4% 13.3% $100,500 18.5%
 Cambodian 6.9% 2.2% 17.8% $120,800 29.3%
BLACKS 9.5% 4.8% 25.2% $80,600 24.9%
*Not included in Asian totals
Education
% earning degree
Source: 2000 U.S. Census
Table II - Socioeconomic Breakdown of Asian Pacific Subgroups
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The federal district court reviewing Denver’s municipal contracting 
program specifically cited disparate rates of business formation among 
included groups as undermining the city’s statistical conclusions.126 The 
Houston district court similarly condemned the “use of aggregate statistics 
[that fail to] show the variation within the groups.”127 
Disparities due to immigration further undermine the 
methodological assumptions of Croson.  Asian, Hispanic, and increasingly 
even Black communities often include large numbers of recent immigrants 
whose relative underrepresentation often reflects causal factors specific to 
immigration—unfamiliarity with US customs, lack of social capital, 
linguistic hurdles, etc.—things that have nothing to do with race and can be 
expected to disappear with the passage of time.  Yet, disparity studies rarely 
attempt to correct for such immigration effects.128 
Such internal heterogeneity raises the danger that nondisadvantaged 
subgroups may ride the coattails of their less fortunate group members.  The 
problem is not just that a few jobs or contracts may go to a group that 
doesn’t deserve them.  Less-disadvantaged groups often end up usurping a 
disproportionate share.129 This phenomenon also applies across minority 
groups and may account for the declining share of affirmative action 
benefits going to African-Americans who must now compete with more 
socio-economically successful minorities  
The risks cut both ways.  Not only can undeserving subgroups 
piggyback on the underrepresented status of a larger group, but genuinely 
disadvantaged subgroups might be unfairly excluded if the larger, umbrella 
 
126 Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
127 Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 554. 
128 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d at 1164 (burden of proof on plaintiff 
to rebut government’s prima facie case). 
129 Malamud, supra note xx, at 321 (“when all members of minority groups are equally 
eligible for affirmative action, the best-off among them will prevail”).  
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group they belong to is too successful.  One sees this in higher education, 
where Asians are often overrepresented and no longer counted for diversity 
purposes.  Yet, several Asian Pacific subgroups remain heavily 
underrepresented.130 Samoan and Laotian students thus suffer from being 
lumped together with more successful East and South Asians.  These groups 
look nothing alike and come from vastly different backgrounds.  Yet, we 
assume they share a common experience based on their “Asian” identity 
that makes them fungible equivalents.131 
Moreover, some arguably disadvantaged minority groups lie outside 
the quadrangle entirely.  A recent study of employment discrimination in 
California looked at discrimination against job applicants with ethnically 
identifiable names.132 The study revealed greater bias against applicants 
with identifiably Arab names than those of any other ethnic group—hardly 
surprising after 9-11.  Yet, most affirmative action programs count Arab-
Americans as White, which means they don’t get counted.   
Therefore, one might question whether the wisdom of relying on 
ethno-racial quadrangle as the basis for government policy.  Although we 
may superficially locate “race” within its coordinates, the quadrangle’s 
explanatory power seems empirically questionable.  In the black box of a 
disparity study, garbage in means garbage out. 
E. From Empiricism to Constitutionalism: A Well-Tailored 
Quadrangle?   
Some might argue that such internal differences are inevitable and 
beside the point.  Race is not a logical construct but a projection of societal 
 
130 Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note xx. 
131 Cf. Metro. Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 615 (1990) (O’Connor, J.) 
(criticizing assumption that there is a single “minority” viewpoint). 
132 Names Make a Difference: The Screening of Resumes by Temporary Employment 
Agencies in California, Report by the Discrimination Research Center (Oct. 2004), on file 
with the author. 
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perceptions and stereotypes.  Accordingly, courts have defended the popular 
consensus approach (and by extension, the quadrangle) on the grounds that 
it captures the sort of intangible, inter-subjective phenomena that are most 
salient to affirmative action.133 
Such arguments would seem to have little merit under the diversity 
rationale presented by Justice Powell in Bakke.  Achieving diversity within 
groups would seem just as important that as between them.  As a proxy for 
viewpoint, the broad quadrangular categories are simply too blunt.134 
Moreover, rather than conforming to existing stereotypes, the goal should 
be to challenge them.  Emphasizing variation within group identities 
encourages students to look beyond them.   
Therefore, this section will focus on remedial affirmative action, a 
context in which using categories that conform to the contours of societal 
prejudice makes more sense.  Arguably, the quadrangular categories “serve 
well as predictors of the dynamics of mistreatment, and thus as a foundation 
for initiatives designed to protect people against such mistreatment or to 
compensate them for it.”135 The Tenth Circuit similarly justifies use of the 
quadrangle based on “the harsh fact that racial discrimination commonly 
occurs along lines of the broad categories.”136 
These arguments justify the quadrangle on functional grounds, i.e. 
they rest on assumptions about how racial bias functions in society.137 The 
 
133 See, e.g. Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561 n.25.   
134 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946-47; McGowan, supra note xx, at 135 (“categorization by 
race or ethnicity fails to capture the complexity of social experience of many groups . . . . 
As a result, real diversity may suffer”); see also id. at 136 (use of race under guise of 
diversity may be motivated by covert remedial goals). 
135 Hollinger, supra note xx, at 33. 
136 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d at 1176, 1185 (holding that there 
was no need for further inquiries at the level of subgroups).  Other courts have similarly 
refused to look behind the standard quandrangular categories.  See Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545; 
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 324 F. Supp. 2d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2004), 
Dynalantic Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 937 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Dist. 1996). 
137 Such a functional approach was demonstrated by the Supreme Court in. Hernandez 
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idea is that if Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans all encounter a 
particular kind of racial prejudice (whereas, e.g., Chinese do not), one can 
say that the former are discriminated against “as Hispanics.”138 The 
category “Hispanic” is defined by the contours of anti-Hispanic bias.   
On one level, this is just the basic law of remedies: defining the 
remedial class based on the scope of the injury.  “To define an Indian or a 
Black to determine who should be counted . . . [you] look at the actual 
discrimination being rectified and treat as Blacks or Indians the same kind 
of people that the defendants had treated as Blacks or Indians.”139 The 
problem with voluntary affirmative action, however, is there is no identified 
tortfeasor to base such decisions on, nor likely any direct evidence of 
discrimination.  In a typical Croson disparity study, the “discrimination” is 
inferred through statistical analysis.  Its scope can be measured only in 
terms of statistical aggregates.  Moreover, the procedural order is inverted:  
Instead of the injury determining the remedial categories, here, racial 
categories must be established in order to demonstrate the existence of the 
injury through statistical disparities measured with respect to such 
categories.  Therefore, unlike a typical tort remedy, the definition question 
must be answered prior to the “selection question.”  Different definitions 
will encompass different data sets, but there may be several variant 
definitions which could each give rise to a valid finding of statistical 
 
v. Texax where the Court contrasted the popular view of Mexican-Americans as racially 
White, with the systematic prejudice that marked them as something “other,” the functional 
equivalent of a separate race.  347 U.S. 475 (1954).  In this case, Hollinger and 10th Circuit 
seek to assimilate such a functional view of race into the popular one. 
138 Cf. Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1176 n.18 (Asian-Americans discriminated against 
because they were Asian-Americans); Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 (defining race as an 
identifiable group subjected to discrimination based on shared traits). 
139 See Montana Contractors' Ass’n. v. Sec’y of Commerce, 460 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 
(D. Mont. 1978) (“In those cases the discriminating actor defines the race as to which relief 
should be granted by his act of discrimination, and when the remedy is fashioned, it 
necessarily is tailored to correct the actual injustice done.”); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 
941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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underrepresentation.  Such definitional choices matter because they define 
the scope of prima facie “discrimination” and hence the presumptive 
contours of any remedy.     
Rocco Luiere’s case illustrates this problem in that the composition 
of the Hispanic data set was actually litigated.140 Since Iberians make up 
only 2% of the Hispanic population of New York State, the state’s finding 
that Hispanics were underrepresented in public contracting would likely 
have been made regardless of whether Iberians were counted in its disparity 
study.  Yet, because the category used to count with dictates the 
presumptive contours around which the remedy will be fashioned, the 
choice of definition going in determined whether Iberians had a prima facie 
claim to share in the remedy.141 Rather than the “injury” defining the 
remedy, in practice, New York’s choice of definition defines the “injury.”  
The definition question thus predetermines New York’s answer to the 
“selection question.” 
Definitional fiats also dictated the outcome of Lebanese contractor 
Nadim Ritchey’s case in Ohio.  In rejecting his challenge to Ohio’s 
“Oriental” category, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “persons of 
Lebanese ancestry have [not been shown to have] suffered disadvantage and 
discrimination in the area of state contracting opportunities to the same 
degree and to the same extent [as] the minority groups listed in [Ohio’s 
statute].”142 In reality, the only discrimination shown against “Orientals” 
was inferred from statistical disparities affecting all “minorities” (i.e. those 
Ohio’s legislature chose to recognize as such).143 Moreover, Ohio defined 
 
140 See Jana-Rock, Memorandum-Decision.  
141 The choice of category thus controls both inputs and outputs.  See Ritchey, 707 
N.E.2d 871 (arguing to do otherwise would run the risk of overinclusiveness, by including 
beneficiaries not shown to have suffered the injury). 
142 Ritchey, 707 N.E.2d at 922. 
143 See id. at 736-37 (criticizing the statistical evidence on which the Ohio legislature 
had relied on for lumping all minority groups together in undifferentiated analysis). 
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its remedial class to include subgroups who may not even have existed 
among Ohio contractors at the time the findings of disparities were 
compiled.144 Had Lebanese been thrown into this mix, presumably they too 
would now be cloaked in the same presumptive entitlement.   
To bestow on the groups who were included a collective blessing 
denied to Lebanese assumes that Ohio had a logical basis for testing only 
the former—an assumption which the Ohio Supreme Court leaves 
unexamined.  Conversely, the Tenth Circuit upheld the inclusion of 
Bhutanese and Samoans in federal set-asides because it assumed that “as 
Asians” they were subject to the discrimination against “Asians” that 
Congress had statistically identified, without questioning the underlying 
definition of “Asian-ness” being relied on.145 
The problem with these cases is that they ignore the crucial 
advantages conferred by inclusion among the “official” minorities of the 
quadrangle.  Once relegated to the status of outsiders, Rocco Luiere and 
Nadim Ritchey faced uphill battles, saddled with the burden of proof to 
overcome their definitional exclusion.146 By contrast, groups such as 
Bhutanese-Americans benefit from their status as definitional insiders on 
several levels.  First, such tiny subgroups are likely too small to generate 
statistically significant evidence of disparities and may not have even been 
present at the relevant time.  Being included in the quadrangle overcomes 
such logistical obstacles and enables these newer subgroups to piggyback 
 
144 Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik , 214 F.3d 730, 737 (noting 
pointedly that “contractors of, let us say, Thai origin . . . might never have been seen in 
Ohio until recently,” yet would receive a preference).  Others appear to have been 
retroactively written into the category definitions. 
145 Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1176 & n.18.   
146 Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d at 922; Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at 
*41; see also Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561.  All these cases effectively put the burden of proof 
on the plaintiff to challenge the category.  Narrow tailoring, however, normally places the 
burden on the government to defend its classifications.  See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 
499, 505 (2005). 
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on a documented history of bias against their ostensible ethnic kin.  Second, 
the fact that Asian, Hispanic, and increasingly even Black communities 
typically include large numbers of recent immigrants confers a built-in 
advantage in disparity analyses, given the likelihood that recent immigrants 
will be inherently underrepresented.   
As a result, who gets counted where matters more than one might 
initially think.  In many cases, the answer to the selection question is 
predetermined by the “definition question.”  Yet, as we have seen, the 
definitions we have emerged in a fairly arbitrary process.  Categories 
concocted without much thought were politically manipulated and 
expanded through dubious exercises in armchair ethnography, then blindly 
replicated and defended by entrenched interest groups.  Moreover, such 
boundary lines continue to be manipulated.  South Asians, for example, 
were retroactively added to Ohio’s “Oriental” category by an executive 
order of the governor, which critics linked to campaign contributions from 
Indian donors.  Portuguese joined California’s Hispanic category under 
similar circumstances.147 
Such political manipulations underscore the Houston court’s dictum 
that “race is politics.”  It is one thing to argue that race is inherently 
subjective and that arbitrary divisions are inevitable.  However, if the 
process by which definitional lines were drawn is itself suspect, it becomes 
more difficult to justify according them a presumptive validity.  From the 
standpoint of a Rocco Luiere or Nadim Ritchey, the playing field hardly 
seems level.148 Furthermore, to the extent such arbitrary definitions result 
 
147 Inspector General of Ohio, Report of Investigation, Case No. 93-39 available at 
http://watchdog.ohio.gov/investigations%5Coiggov.htm#pri.
148 One could argue that the “consensus” around the quadrangle merely obscures an 
original injustice.  This begs the question as to an appropriate remedy.  If the popular 
consensus is now a fait-accompli, is it too late to go back?  Trademark law offers some 
precedent for forced efforts to reverse popular attitudes.  Cf. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Inc., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).  Admittedly, the weight 
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in the inclusion of otherwise undeserving subgroups (or omission of others 
that are deserving), this raises the danger of over- or underinclusiveness in 
the remedy.  This turns an empirical debate into a constitutional question:  
Must affirmative action definitions be narrowly tailored to serve the goals 
of affirmative action in order for the remedy to comply with strict scrutiny?   
Enforcing such narrow tailoring of categories would help to align 
the definition question with the selection question in that the same 
normative concerns would apply to both.  When it comes to analyzing such 
“category tailoring” issues, however, courts have been all over the page.  
Most simply ignore the issue.  Others have invoked obstacles. of 
standing,149 manipulated burdens of proof,150 limited their assessment to the 
facts “as applied,”151 or demanded evidence of bad intent.152 Courts have 
also struggled to locate this kind of equal protection challenge within 
existing doctrine.  Such definitional questions could be cognized in two 
different ways: either (1) as a facial challenge to the definition qua racial 
classification or (2) as a narrow tailoring challenge to the remedy that 
follows from it.153 Courts have followed both approaches, sometimes in the 
same opinion.154 They have also differed as to the level of scrutiny they 
apply.155 
of momentum to be overcome in this context is far greater. 
149 Peightal, 940 F.2d at 1409 n.39 (questioning plaintiff’s standing as white male to 
object to Hispanic definition). 
150 Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545; Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio Sup. Ct.). 
151 Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545; Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of 
Econ. Dev., 5:04-CV-635, Memorandum-Decision and Order, Oct. 28, 2004 (N.D.N.Y.). 
152 Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050. 
153 Compare Jana-Rock Memorandum-Decision (facial classification approach), with 
Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545 (narrow tailoring analysis). 
154 Cf. Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050. 
155 Compare Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050; Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647, 
with Ritchey trial court.  In Rocco Luiere’s case, the district court fundamentally 
misconceived the doctrinal requirements in this regard.  Cf. Jana-Rock Memorandum-
Decision (opting for rational basis on dubious ground that “a person of Spanish descent 
does not qualify as a member of a suspect class either on the basis of race or national 
origin”).   
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Many courts simply assume that disparity testing itself “validates” 
the choice of racial categories by identifying discrimination against the 
population they encompass,156 reducing definitional uncertainties to a 
statutory interpretation issue, “more a question of nomenclature than of 
narrow tailoring.”157 Yet, it seems circular to argue that findings of 
statistical disparities validate the choice of initial categories because, as we 
have seen, such definitions can be manipulated without altering the 
statistical conclusion.  Since the discrimination is merely inferred 
statistically, its accuracy depends partly on the assumptions that shape its 
inputs.   
Therefore, even if Hollinger and the 10th Circuit are correct to 
suggest that patterns of prejudice broadly track the popular consensus on 
race, this still does not mean that each and every included subgroup in these 
broad racial categories experiences “race” the same way.  Given the 
haphazard way in which such categories were created, the risk of outliers 
cannot be dismissed.  If the quadrangle only imperfectly tracks the criteria 
relevant to the purposes of affirmative action, such an imperfect “fit” would 
still raise narrow tailoring issues.158 Blind deference to existing definitions 
therefore seems unfounded.  Since the choice of categories helps determine 
who is preferred (and who is excluded) on the basis of race, courts should 
arguably require some justification for drawing such lines that goes beyond 
the reflexive rubberstamping of federal definitions.159 
156 Cf. Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d at 893-95 (arguing that disparity testing defines 
the limits of narrow tailoring).   
157 Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1185.  Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court determines category 
boundaries according to their dictionary meaning.  See Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d at 927 
(construing “the common, ordinary, and everyday meaning of the term ‘Oriental’”).  
158 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“deviations from equality require utmost precision”) 
159 See Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at *31-32 (arguing New York needed to 
tailor its categories to its own context).   
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This Article has suggested a “categorical tailoring” approach that 
would align the definition question with the “selection” question leaving 
both to be answered in a manner narrow tailored to serve the normative 
goals of affirmative action.  Such an approach would draw inspiration from 
Croson itself.  Although the bulk of the Croson decision ignores the 
“definition question,” it did offer some cryptic hints regarding “categorical 
tailoring” requirements.   
In Croson, the Court was primarily concerned with the evidentiary 
showing of particularized discrimination needed to legitimate racial 
preferences.  The Court rejected Richmond’s evidence of discrimination 
against minority-owned businesses in the local construction industry as 
falling short of the statistical standards the Court required.160 However, 
what make Croson unique from the standpoint of the Who Question is that 
the opinion went beyond this generalized majority-minority paradigm to 
distinguish between minority groups.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
O’Connor noted that the Richmond had made a colorable case for inclusion 
of only one group, African-Americans.  By contrast, no evidence 
whatsoever had been offered to show discrimination in the local 
construction industry against any of the other minority groups that 
Richmond had made eligible for preferences, including “Spanish-speaking, 
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons.”161 Justice O'Connor 
commented archly that “[i]t may well be that Richmond has never had an 
Aleut or Eskimo citizen.”  She observed that the “random inclusion of 
[such] groups” belied Richmond’s remedial intent.162 
This brief venture by the Court into the uncharted terrain of the Who 
Question reads like an aside, occupying two paragraphs in a otherwise 
 
160 Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-502. 
161 See id. at 506.  
162 Id.   
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lengthy opinion. So it may be unwise to overread its significance.  Perhaps 
Justice O’Connor only meant to stress the absurdity of including such 
“random” groups as Aleuts.  However, O’Connor also questioned the 
inclusion of other minority groups who were represented in Richmond’s 
construction industry (albeit in small numbers).  Moreover, much of the 
evidence Richmond had offered—including its statistical analysis—
pertained to minority contractors as a whole without differentiating by race.  
Nonetheless, Croson drew a clear distinction between the undeniable (albeit 
inadequate) evidence of bias against Blacks and the complete lack of 
evidence of bias against any other group.  By parsing this evidence to 
distinguish Blacks from other minorities, Croson seemed to suggest that 
Richmond needed to have done its disparity testing on a more targeted 
basis.   
What to make of this?  Croson’s disparity testing methodology was 
modeled on the Court’s Title VII case law in which lumping minorities 
together for statistical purposes had not hitherto been seen as 
objectionable.163 What may have been different here was specific evidence 
of historical discrimination in the record pertaining exclusively to African-
Americans (who also constituted the overwhelming majority of minorities 
in Richmond).  Therefore, the Court may have seen Blacks as a special case 
in that context, demanding individualized analysis.164 
163 See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 568 (1979) (Hispanic and 
Black employees counted together in assessment of disparate impact of methadone ban); 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 642 (1989) (all “minorities” pooled in 
statistical disparity assessment); Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. 
United States 433 U.S. 299, 307-308 (1977)). 
164 Similarly, in Montana Contractors, the court rejected the inclusion of other 
minority groups when the evidence in the record really focused on Native Americans.  460 
F. Supp. 1174 (D. Mont. 1978). 
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In practice, the almost universal approach has been to assess 
underrepresentation based on the standard quadrangular categories.165 Yet, 
given the diversity of contexts in which affirmative action operates, the 
ubiquity of the quadrangle arguably bespeaks a “one-size-fits-all” approach 
that runs contrary to the dictates of narrow tailoring.  Several courts have 
taken a dim view of affirmative action plans that adopt such a “laundry list” 
approach to category-making, drawing analogies to Croson’s “random 
inclusion” of Aleuts.166 
Croson strongly implies that the mere fact that Richmond defined a 
data set that may have “included” Aleuts in a definitional sense would not 
justify their inclusion in the ensuing remedy if there were no Aleuts actually 
present.167 Croson also makes it clear that the subsequent arrival of an 
Aleut contingent would do nothing to alter this analysis, since African-
American contractors who “actually suffered” discrimination should not be 
obliged to share their remedy with such Johnny-come-latelies.168 
Following Croson’s lead, lower courts have duly incorporated a 
“random inclusiveness” prong as part of their narrow tailoring review.  
Thus, a Sixth Circuit panel found Ohio’s definition of “Oriental” 
 
165 See George LaNoue, To the 'Disadvantaged' Go the Spoils?, PUBLIC INTEREST 
Winter 2000, at 91.  Where statistical evidence of disparities for particular groups has 
proven lacking, courts have held such groups ineligible.  See, e.g. Contractors Assoc. of E. 
Penn., Inc. v. Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d. Cir. 1993) (non-black minority groups enjoined 
from inclusion within municipal affirmative action program). 
166 Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 
2001).  See also Houston Contractors Ass’n v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris County, 993 
F. Supp. 545, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (criticizing Texas for “cop[ying] whatever the federal 
government required to get federal funds without a determination of the categories or the 
applicability to Texas’s experience.”); Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 
(9th Cir. 1997) (speculating that “those who drafted the statute for the legislature copied 
from a model form and neglected to strike its inapplicable portions”). 
167 To do this, Richmond would not have to count any actual Aleuts in compiling its 
minority data.  All it would do was define a data set of “all minorities” that theoretically 
embraced any Aleuts who might have happened to be there.  Assuming disparities were 
established for that data set, the same “all minority” category would then constitute the 
remedial class which, by definition, included Aleuts.   
168 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508 (1989). 
42
overinclusive, in part, because it included groups “who might never have 
been seen in Ohio until recently” such as Thai-Americans.169 Drawing an 
analogy to Richmond’s Aleuts, the court argued that including Thais in a 
beneficiary category would violate narrow tailoring.170 San Francisco chose 
to omit Dominicans from its Hispanic definition on similar grounds.171 
The problem with this sort of categorical tailoring analysis is that it 
has no logical stopping point:  If narrow tailoring requires attention to 
subgroups, how small does one have to go?172 Almost any group definition 
will include an identifiable subset of people who were/are not actually 
present at some relevant time.173 Pushed to the limit, categorical tailoring 
of this form would require individualized analysis to a degree that would 
preclude group remedies based on race.174 
To avoid such difficulties, we should return to the Tenth Circuit’s 
functional test which defines the “relevant group” according to the context 
 
169 In Croson, Aleuts had been explicitly identified as a racial category on their own, 
whereas Thais were merely a subgroup within Ohio’s Oriental category.  It is unclear, 
however, why this fact should be dispositive.  Would the Court have less perturbed had 
Richmond defined a category of “Native Americans” that included Aleuts?  In fact, 
Richmond did have a separate category of “Indians,” although presumably not every single 
federally recognized tribe was represented among Richmond’s population of contractors. 
170 See id. at 737; see also Monterrey Mechanical, 125 F.3d at 714 (same problem with 
Aleuts in California). 
171 Interview with Mara Rosales, Office of City Attorney, San Francisco, February 2, 
1998 (explaining that the Dominicans had not been represented in the relevant population 
of contactors). 
172 The Sixth Circuit distinguished Thai from Chinese.  But there are many different 
ethnic/linguistic subgroups among Chinese.  Does it matter whether the Chinese were 
Cantonese vs. Hakka?  Race and ethnicity can be disaggregated endlessly down to 
individual villages and extended families.  But at some point, such distinctions no longer 
seem relevant from the standpoint of US policy.   
173 “Presence” also is a murky concept—if a single Aleut had wandered through 
Richmond fifty years ago and suffered discrimination, would this suffice?  If not, how 
many and how recent?  Would they have to have been actual contractors who were “ready 
and able” to bid? or just potential contractors?   
174 In theory, such individualized analysis is already required under the constitutional 
standards governing consideration of race in university admissions, although the use of 
broad racial categories to assess diversity undercuts this claim to individuation.  Croson 
also gestures toward individualized appraisals by requiring “opt out” provisions and 
procedures to challenge individual eligibility.  Croson, 488 U.S. at 508. 
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in which such group identities function.  If Ohio bigots are functionally 
incapable of distinguishing between Thais and other Asians subgroups, then 
Ohio can justify defining race broadly.  Arguably, it should not matter that 
the only victims of historical discrimination happened to have been 
Chinese.  So long as “Asian-American individuals [were] subject to 
discrimination because of their status as Asian-Americans” there is no need 
to distinguish between them by subgroup, since in functional terms Thais 
constitute the racial equivalent of Chinese.175 
Adopting such an external perspective on race pushes us back 
toward a “popular consensus” view.176 We can assume that beyond national 
origin, finer distinctions regarding group identity are likely irrelevant.  Yet, 
a popular view of race is not necessarily synonymous with a functional 
reading.  One sees a divergence between popular vs. functional conceptions 
of race, for example, with Black immigrant groups in New York.  Although 
most people would unquestionably identify Nigerians and Jamaicans as 
racially “Black,” these groups don’t seem to attract the same degree of 
racial prejudice as African-Americans.177 At least in the job market, 
employers have either learned to look beyond color and differentiate by 
 
175 Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1176 n.18 (emphasis added).  Arguably, equating Thais with 
Chinese here is no different than counting both Fujienese and Hunanese as Chinese when 
only the former had a historical presence.   
176The results of an external approach to “functional race” will not always be 
coterminous with the popular consensus.  Ohio bigots might learn to distinguish Thais from 
Chinese and discriminate more discriminately even though continuing to regard both 
groups as “Asian.”  Similarly, one might conclude that Chinese and Thai students bring 
different sorts of diversity to the classroom, even if their fellow students initially fail to 
distinguish between them.   
177 See Lee, supra note xx, at 184.  The likely explanations are complex and cultural: 
West Indian and African immigrants appear less burdened by pernicious stereotypes than 
domestic Blacks.  They never experienced the psychic wounds inflicted by slavery and Jim 
Crow.  They also tend to have stronger family support structures and more positive role 
models.   
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subgroup, or are otherwise responsive to cultural nuances that permit such 
immigrants to evade the full brunt of racial prejudice.178 
Therefore, the quadrangle is still subject to scrutiny on a functional 
basis, as the Seventh Circuit demonstrated:  That court rejected Cook 
County’s Hispanic category because it included Spanish and Portuguese-
Americans, “groups . . . that common sense (not contradicted by any 
evidence) instructs have never been subject to significant discrimination by 
Cook County.”179 Even though Iberians arguably fell within the popular 
meaning of “Hispanic,” they failed Judge Posner’s functional test of racial 
meaning because they were not subject to the kind of anti-Hispanic 
prejudice that the remedy was intended to target.  Because the remedial 
category did not “fit” the purpose of the remedy, it violated narrow 
tailoring.180 This sort of “categorical tailoring” analysis has also been 
applied to underinclusive categories, i.e. those which omit subgroups 
similar to the ones included.181 
Croson also strongly emphasized the importance of the local 
evidentiary context.  In holding that only “particularized findings” of 
discrimination could justify race-conscious remedies, the Court rejected 
Congressional findings of discrimination in construction contracting 
 
178 The stereotype of Jamaicans as having a strong work ethic—as portrayed in such 
mainstream television shows as “In Living Color” (where the Jamaican characters were all 
portrayed as working multiple jobs)—may have convinced some that Jamaicans were the 
“good” kind of Black.  Others may simply like their exotic accents. 
179 Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647. 
180 Note that it did not matter whether Chicago could demonstrate a statistical disparity 
based on a Hispanic data set that happened to include Iberians.  Posner found the category 
itself so inherently implausible that by defining “Hispanic” in this over-inclusive manner, 
the category was void ab initio. Just as Croson objected to Richmond’s lumping Blacks 
together with other minority groups not subject to the same discriminatory history, the 
racial experience of Iberians was deemed too “unlike” other Hispanics to treat them the 
same.   
181 Ohio’s inclusion of South Asians, but not Lebanese in its “Oriental” category was 
deemed underinclusive for this reason.  Ritchey Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590 at 
*6.  See also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 n.37 (questioning of preferences to Mexican-
Americans, but not other Hispanics under a diversity rationale). 
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nationwide as insufficient to support preferences in the municipal 
context.182 Instead, to survive strict scrutiny, Richmond had to identify 
discrimination locally in the specific sector for which it proposed a remedy.  
Similarly, the Court’s objection to Richmond’s lumping Blacks with other 
“minorities” seemed to turn on the specific local history of anti-Black bias.  
Accordingly, one might infer that categorical tailoring should be informed 
by attention to the local context as well.   
The Second Circuit followed this rationale when it argued that New 
York State needed to “mak[e] an independent assessment of discrimination 
against Hispanics of Spanish origin in New York.”183 Other courts have 
echoed this view.184 As one court observed, “the needs of the Japanese in 
Hawaii are [not] the same as those of the Japanese in California . . . the 
needs of [American] Indians in New York are [not] the same as those of the 
Indians in Montana.”185 Texas’ restriction of affirmative action to groups 
most subject to historical discrimination in Texas similarly met the Fifth 
Circuit’s approval as evidence of narrow tailoring.186 
Some courts despair at the complexities such categorical tailoring 
demands implicate.  Perhaps the most forthright such response was that of 
the Second Circuit in Rocco Luiere’s case, where the court noted that: 
the fact that a particular governmental decision to use 
classifications based on race or national origin in a particular 
context passes strict scrutiny does not relieve those 
 
182 See 488 U.S. at 504. 
183 Id. at *31-32 (emphasis added). 
184 See Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 555 (criticizing Texas for employing 
generic affirmative action categories that fail to take into account Texas’s specific racial 
history and social context). 
185 Montana Contractors, 460 F. Supp. at 1178; see also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., 
NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES 175 (1996) 
(distinguishing the social position of Aleuts in Anchorage from that in Richmond).  In fact, 
Hawaii does not include Japanese in affirmative action, having devised more focused 
categories tailored to its diverse Asian populace.   
186 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932. 
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categories of their possible arbitrariness and unreliability . . . 
Indeed, we find it difficult to imagine what a “correct” racial 
classification would be.  It will always exclude persons who 
have individually suffered past discrimination and include 
those who have not.187 
The Second Circuit “solved” the problem by denying that narrow tailoring 
applied.188 
Other courts have veered to the opposite extreme, unable to accept 
the idea that “[b]y its very nature, [a race-conscious] program is both 
underinclusive and overinclusive.”189 These courts regard the problem as 
effectively fatal.190 
Yet, arguably, neither extreme deference nor presumptive invalidity 
is appropriate. Race is messy, and there are no perfect answers.  But this 
does not mean we should give up trying.  Narrow tailoring has never been 
held to require a perfect fit.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
insisted that when it comes to affirmative action, strict scrutiny must not be 
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”191 Therefore, this means finding “a 
permissible middle ground . . . between the entirely individualized inquiry 
of a Title VII lawsuit, for example, and an unconstitutionally sweeping, 
race-based generalization.”192 
How then should such a “permissible middle ground” be defined?  
Equally importantly, on what basis can we assess categorical validity to 
 
187 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at *33-34.  See also Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561 n.25 
(decrying the “troubling” and “vexatious” nature of group definitions because of the sheer 
“irrationality” of race). 
188 Id.  Oddly, the Second Circuit accepted categorical tailoring applied to 
overinclusiveness.  Its holding only rejected tailoring claims based on underinclusiveness. 
189 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D.Colo. 1997). 
190 Id. (finding “it difficult to imagine a race-based classification that is narrowly 
tailored)”; see also Ritchey Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, *6 (same); Houston 
Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 557 (“[r]ace has never been either narrow or accurate”).  
191 Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
192 Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1186 (rejecting the district court’s tailoring analysis because 
‘[r]equiring that degree of fit would render strict scrutiny “fatal in fact”’). 
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make such determinations?  The arbitrary basis on which the quadrangle 
was created, as well as its internal heterogeneity, and lack of responsiveness 
to local context counsel against blind deference to the status quo.  But 
before we reject the quadrangle as an inadequate “map” to locate racial 
disadvantage,193 we need a way to construct better categories to count with.   
F. An Epistemology of Race and The Limits of Judicial 
Scrutiny 
As we have seen, courts on both sides of the definitional debate have 
endorsed a functional test to map racial meaning based on commonalities of 
experience.194 Crudely put, this asks whether we can expect bigots to 
discriminate equally against Japanese and Pakistanis before we lump into 
the same category.195 Operationalizing such a standard, however, presents a 
formidable challenge.  It can be divided into three parts:  The first is 
normative:  We need to identify the function of race in affirmative action.196 
The second challenge is methodological:  Assuming we know what we are 
looking for, how do we measure it and map out its boundaries?  Third, we 
must address the question of context—where should we gather the relevant 
data? nationally? regionally? within a single industry? or across society? 
Discussion of normative issues will be deferred until Part II-D.  For 
now, let us continue to use discrimination as our reference point, without 
defining it further.  The questions then become how and where do we look 
 
193 Amicus scholars, supra note xxx, at 879. 
194 This might be caricatured as “Hispanic is as Hispanic does” (or is done to).  In 
particular, we need to understand how race functions in terms of salient social phenomena 
targeted by affirmative action. 
195 In diversity terms, the question might be whether Samoans and Sri Lankans bring a 
set of shared perspectives to the classroom.  And we also need to establish that such 
commonalities set these groups apart from others. 
196 This can be understood in different ways—from the effects of racial stereotypes to 
the value of diversity in education.  The relevant criteria will thus vary depending on the 
rationale behind a particular program.  Are we looking for intentional acts of hostile 
bigotry?  Lingering patterns of disadvantage?  Structural barriers?  Diverse perspectives in 
a classroom?  Civic representation in elite institutions?  See infra notes xx. 
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for it?  To begin with, we need an empirical basis to detect discrimination.  
In Croson, we already possess one such a tool.  It uses disparities as a proxy 
for discrimination.  Croson uses such disparities to answer the selection 
question (i.e. who qualifies for a remedy), but, in theory, we could answer 
the definition question this way as well.  Examining the underrepresentation 
of racial subgroups could help us design better categories to count with and 
thus ensure more narrowly tailored remedies.  For example, to decide 
whether to include Iberians in our definition of “Hispanic,” we could count 
Iberians separately.  If our findings for the subgroup diverge significantly 
from the group as a whole, we would adjust our definition of “Hispanic” 
thereafter to exclude them.197 
The problem with this approach is that Croson restricts the context 
in which such counting occurs.  Data on subgroups might be inadequate to 
assess disparities in highly particularized contexts.198 For example, there 
are likely not enough Iberian highway contractors in New York City to 
generate statistical findings with any confidence.  Croson’s focus on a 
narrow context thus requires us to work with broader group categories, 
which, as we have seen, risks over- or under-inclusiveness.   
To avoid such narrow tailoring concerns, we need another way to 
look at subgroups and refine our category definitions.  Particularized 
underrepresentation is not the only way to locate discrimination.  To narrow 
the focus to subgroups, we must broaden the context.  Instead of examining 
Hispanic contractors in one industry, we could undertake a broader 
assessment of societal prejudice against various plausibly “Hispanic” 
 
197 If this approach worked, we could also eliminate a step by making 
underrepresentation of subgroups the sole determinant: i.e. counting not just Iberians, but 
also Brazilians, Argentineans, every other national origin subgroup separately.   
198 This problem already affects groups such as Native Americans whose numbers are 
often too small too generate statistically meaningful evidence.  As a result, Native 
Americans have been omitted from many municipal contracting programs. 
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subgroups to see which ones seem most likely to be victimized by racial 
bias.199 
Shifting to a societal focus to answer the definition question makes 
sense, since the goal is not to identify discrimination with the specificity 
necessary to justify a remedy, but rather to assess the pathways such 
discrimination is likely to follow as an initial step.  This preliminary 
definitional analysis would allow us to refine our categories definitions 
which would then be used in the ensuing “selection phase” to detect 
particularized discrimination with increased confidence.    
Courts that have engaged in “categorical tailoring” do appear to rely 
implicitly on such societal assessments.  In disagreeing as to whether 
Iberian-Americans should be counted as "Hispanic,” the Second, Seventh, 
and Eleventh Circuit all framed the issue as whether Iberians faced 
discrimination in a broader sense than the particularized context at issue.  
That said, how do we resolve the issue?  Whether or not Iberians face 
societal discrimination is an empirical question.200 Yet, in none of these 
cases was any attempt made to answer through evidence.  Instead, such 
courts justified their underlying intuitions by manipulating the burden of 
proof201 or relying on generalized ipse dixit as to the “nature of 
discrimination.”202 
This brings us back to the challenge that Justice Powell saw as 
intractable.  Since almost every ethnic group has experienced discrimination 
 
199 This shift to a societal focus could still be confined to a localized context such as 
New York City.  An alternative approach would be to look at data on Iberian highway 
contractors nationwide and interpolate those findings to the local context, as Richmond 
tried to do in Croson in relying on findings by Congress.  But see Jana-Rock, 2006 C. App. 
Lexis 4050, (rejecting Croson to preclude that approach). 
200 The answer is unlikely to be all or nothing.  One might express the perceived 
“Hispanic-ness” of Iberians in percentage terms of how often they are identified as Latino 
relative to other Hispanic subgroups.  Perhaps over fifty percent would be the cutoff.   
201 Ritchey, 707 N.E.2d at 927; Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647. 
202 Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 642. 
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to some degree, he saw no principled basis to choose between them.  
Unable to evaluate such “amorphous” claims judicially and unwilling to 
defer to political bodies lest “racial classification[s become] merely the 
product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics,”203 the Court 
has rejected societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative action.   
Instead, the Court redirects the analysis to particularized contexts, 
focusing on underrepresentation in local contracting or diverse viewpoints 
of individual candidates.  It seeks comfort in statistics to sort through the 
complexities of race.  Yet, by telling us how to count, but not whom, the 
Supreme Court answers only half the Who Question.   
Such omission cannot be merely accidental.  After four decades of 
affirmative action litigation, if the Court had wanted to probe the logic of 
racial categories, it surely could have found a way to do so.204 The 
comments of individual justices writing outside the majority betray a 
noticeable disquietude at the unanswered questions the Who Question 
raises.  Several members of the Court have pressed the issue of over-
/underinclusiveness writing outside the majority, arguing that singling out 
certain minority groups but not others for preferred treatment may violate 
equal protection.205 Justice Kennedy also questioned the politics underlying 
 
203 Croson, 488 U.S. at 497, 506, 510.   
204 The Supreme Court selects the cases it wants to review through grant of certiorari 
and can direct parties to brief additional issues it deems relevant.  Cf. Pildes & Niemi, 
supra note xx, at 498 (noting in a different equal protection context that “[t]he Court could 
have asked the parties to address or reargue” a racial issue and ascribing the Court’s failure 
to do so to “the caution and tentativeness that characterizes the current Court’s approach to 
race.”) 
205 For example, Justice Douglas questioned the preference shown to Filipinos, but not 
Japanese by the University of Washington.  DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Likewise, Justice Powell suggested that the list of groups 
targeted by University of California was both underinclusive Bakke, 438 U.S at 309 n.45.  
(“The University is unable to explain its selection of only the four favored groups.") and 
overinclusive, id. at 310 ("The inclusion of [Asians] is especially curious in light of the 
substantial numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions process). See also 
Metro. Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J. dissenting) 
(criticizing enumeration of preferred racial groups as underinclusive); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 
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specific category definitions.206 Yet, with the exception of Croson’s brief 
aside, the Court’s majority and plurality opinions have stuck doggedly 
within the confines of a majority/minority framework.207 
Viewed in this light, the Court’s failure to address the 
constitutionality of racial category-making can be seen as part of a larger 
pattern running through much of the Court's recent cases, namely the 
profound discomfort which the Court exhibits in coming to terms with race.  
In contrast with the racial jurisprudence of the nineteenth century where 
courts freely indulged in the racial classification game,208 the modern Court 
shuns such inquiries, because it recognizes that there are no easy answers.  
Racial classifications, the Court has belatedly acknowledged, reflect social 
conventions more than biological truth.209 Rather than stray into such 
subjective and sensitive terrain, the Court prefers to rhetorically distance 
itself from the social reality of race, referring to it instead in terms of its 
most superficial attribute—skin color.210 
Indeed, the very model of strict scrutiny that defines the modern 
Court's equal protection jurisprudence posits race as an irrelevant, even 
distasteful phenomena to be tolerated only under extreme circumstances.211 
at 537-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that selection of preferred classes failed a 
rational basis test); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267, 284 n.13 (opinion of Powell, J.).   
206 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (relating attempt to exclude 
Cubans from Hispanic group “on the grounds that [they] are republicans”). 
207 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486 (“[t]here has been no showing in this case that 
Congress has . . . exclud[ed] from coverage an identifiable minority group that has been the 
victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered 
by the groups encompassed.”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n.35 (1978) (Opinion of Marshall, 
Brennan, Blackmun, and White) ( “We are not asked to determine whether groups other 
than those favored . . . should similarly be favored.  All we asked to do is to pronounce the 
constitutionality of [the affirmative action]”). 
208 HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW, supra note xx. 
209 St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987). 
210 See Gotanda, supra note xx, at 3, 40.  An extreme example of such rhetorical 
distancing is Justice Thomas’ dissent in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 n.3 (likening racial 
preferences to an “aesthetic” of skin color). 
211 Instead of engaging in the “variable sociological and political analysis” required to 
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The problem with a doctrinal structure premised on dismissing race as an 
irrelevancy is that affirmative action is one area where, by hypothesis, race 
does matter.212 So long as one accepts that racially-explicit group remedies 
may, in some circumstances, pass constitutional muster, recognition of the 
salience of group identities becomes unavoidable.   
Focusing on particularized contexts does not so much answer this 
larger societal question as deflect it.  Relying on numbers to answer the 
Who Question abstracts the question of group selection from the issue of 
group definition.  In doing so, the Court avoids an inquiry into the 
underlying societal significance of race at the cost of continued definitional 
ambiguity.  Moreover, permitting policy-makers to rely on the quadrangle 
by default means counting with categories that are themselves suspect, the 
product of the same “unthinking stereotypes or . . . racial politics” that the 
Court has feared all along.213 
At what point then does a court become obligated to pierce the 
statistical curtain of disparity studies and probe the logic of category-
making behind it?  While the Supreme Court can rely on docket control to 
avoid answering awkward questions, lower courts have no such luxury.  As 
the Who Question is increasingly raised in affirmative action litigation, 
courts have begun to press its definitional aspects through the rubric of 
narrow tailoring.  Yet, the Supreme Court’s silence has led to doctrinal 
confusion.  Courts also lack access to the kind of empirical evidence the 
Who Question demands.   
 
unravel the complexities of race (to use Justice Powell’s terminology), the Court instead 
treats race as a Gordian knot, a tangle of “suspect” and “corrosive” stereotypes to be cut 
through by strict scrutiny. 
212 See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (majority); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-301 
nn.1-7 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (giving statistics to document). 
213 Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). 
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To confront the Who Question ultimately means navigating the 
minefield of race and addressing its enduring significance in society.  Faced 
with this challenge, Justice Powell recoiled, declining to engage in the 
“variable sociological and political analysis” required.214 Indeed, not only 
Powell questioned whether such analysis was feasible, but also whether it 
would be desirable.215 Instead, Justice Powell retreats into a kind of 
historical relativism in which everyone has suffered and thus no one claim 
stands above another.  As an empirical matter, this accounting of racial 
equities seems seriously flawed.  Even if other groups have suffered 
historically, the real issue is where do the effects of discrimination linger 
today.216 Justices O’Connor and Powell seem to confuse this point almost 
willfully.  They situate societal discrimination entirely in the past and then 
plead helplessness before the fog of history.   
This deliberate distancing of constitutional equality review from the 
societal realities of race has long been subject to a broader critique by 
constitutional scholars and critical race theorists.217 Such critics have 
argued for an alternative approach that would contextualize the Court’s 
inquiry and redirect affirmative action toward eradicating societal 
hierarchies.218 In Gratz v. Bollinger, Justice Ginsburg cites a wealth of 
social science research documenting the enduring racial disparities which 
persist “[i]n the wake of ‘a system of racial caste system only recently 
 
214 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297.  On its face, Powell was merely stating that this analysis lay 
outside the judicial competence.  However, neither he nor any other member of the Court 
has suggested that a societal analysis conducted by any other branch of government would 
past muster.   
215 See id.
216 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 463  (purpose of preferential remedies is to address 
present effect of past discrimination).  
217 See, e.g. Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1314-18; Gotanda, supra note xx, at 40-47. 
218 The Court has taken notice of de facto caste systems in other contexts.  See 
Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 476-77 (describing social exclusion of Mexican-Americans).  Cf. 
Haney López, supra note xx, at 1163 (arguing for generalization of Hernandez approach). 
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ended.’”219 Members of racial minorities—in particular Hispanics and 
Blacks—are shown to fare much worse than Whites across a wide range of 
societal indicators.220 Such scholarship would seem to belie Justice 
O’Connor’s claims that the effects of societal discrimination are “inherently 
unmeasurable.”   
As a prudential matter, however, was Powell right?  Even if societal 
evidence could be meaningfully evaluated by the Court, should it decline 
the opportunity?  Is dabbling in racial reengineering on a societal scale 
sufficiently fraught with danger that it should be avoided?  Other members 
of the Court have conjured similarly ominous visions of such a project, 
invoking Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa as the legal precedents 
we would have to draw upon.221 Yet, these admittedly distasteful examples 
do not exhaust the list of available models.  There is another country which 
has committed itself to societal reengineering which may offer a more 
appealing precedent.  That country is India.   
 
II. Lessons From Abroad:  Does India Hold the Answer? 
A. India’s Empirical Approach 
Like the US, India is a diverse, multi-ethnic democracy struggling to 
overcome the legacy of centuries of officially-sanctioned segregation and 
discrimination.  Although Indian affirmative action focuses on caste, not 
 
219 See Gratz 539 U.S. at 299 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)).   
220 See Gratz 539 U.S. at 299-303 & especially nn.1-9 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  An amicus brief submitted by the American Sociological Association offered 
an even more comprehensive compilation of scholarship on racial disadvantage.  See Brief 
of the American Sociological Association, et. al., 2002 U.S. Briefs 241 (2003). 
221 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that objective 
administration of racial classifications will require emulation of Nazi Reich’s Citizenship 
Law of November 14, 1935); Metro. Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (facetious citation to Apartheid statute from South Africa).   
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race, there are close parallels.  In both cases, beneficiary groups are defined 
primarily by ancestry (unlike, e.g. Brazilian affirmative action which is 
based on color).222 India and the US also share the common challenge of 
sorting through competing claims to entitlement from a diversity of groups 
(unlike, e.g., in Malaysia or Fiji, where affirmative action focuses solely on 
one group).223 Like the US, India operates under a Common Law tradition.  
Moreover, its written constitution interpreted by an activist judiciary 
adheres closely to the US model of public law.224 
Unlike the US Supreme Court, however, which rejected any attempt 
to measure societal discrimination, India has developed a rather 
sophisticated methodology to measure such effects empirically.  A series of 
high-profile national commissions have studied the problem, and the 
selection criteria they developed have been extensively litigated, with 
several cases reaching the Indian Supreme Court.   
The purpose of affirmative action in India is to remedy the societal 
effects of caste discrimination.225 The caste system began as a hierarchical 
system of social ordering within the framework of traditional Hindu belief.  
Based on birth, caste membership determined one’s station in society.  
Groups at the top of the hierarchy enjoyed superior resources, status, and 
privilege, while those at the bottom endured ostracism and abuse. 
Broad parallels exist between Indian caste and American race.  
There were five categories in the traditional caste system—not unlike the 
five racial groups we identify in the US.  Ranked in descending order in the 
 
222 Seth Racusen, Making the “Impossible” Determination: Flexible Identity and 
Targeted Opportunity in Contemporary Brazil, 36 CONN. L. REV. 787 (2004). 
223 SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note xx. 
224 Cunningham & Menon, supra note xx.  In this respect, India’s legal system has 
more in common with the US than other common law systems whose adherence to 
traditional English notions of parliamentary supremacy and unwritten constitutionalism 
inhibit the role that courts play in policy-making. 
225 Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC.C.C. 217 (1992).   
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hierarchy, Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras made up the four 
official castes or varnas. Beneath them (and outside the formal caste 
system) were the “outcastes,” or so-called “untouchables.”   
At each of these five levels, the broader categories divide into 
smaller caste groups known as jatis (or jats), just as racial groups in the US 
are sometimes broken down by ethnicity or national origin.226 The jatis 
were the focus of caste identities; they determined what you did for a living, 
where you lived, the deities you worshipped, the foods you ate, and whom 
you could marry.227 Even today, such identities exert powerful influence on 
Indian life.  To be born to a lower caste retains an enduring stigma.   
Officially, caste discrimination has been banned.  Yet, as with 
Segregation in the US, patterns of disadvantage continue.  And because the 
caste system had a pyramidical structure, there are many groups in the 
lower echelons that can plausibly claim to experience such disadvantage—
not unlike the “majority of minorities” that Justice Powell talked about in 
Bakke. However, where Powell rejected any attempt to choose between 
competing groups, India does exactly that.   
The starting point in this process remains the caste hierarchy.  For 
the groups at the very bottom—the so-called Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes—traditional status alone determines eligibility.228 Under the Indian 
constitution, these groups are automatically allotted a “reservation” (quota) 
for all civil service jobs, university admissions, and electoral 
representation.229 
226 JENKINS, supra note xx at 85. 
227 check on deitiesXXX  caste elders as governance. 
228 The Scheduled Castes consist mostly of the former untouchables (now known as 
Dalits), while the Scheduled Tribes comprise tribal groups isolated from mainstream 
society.   
229 JENKINS, supra note xx at 2. 
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For a much larger group of affirmative action beneficiaries, 
however, known as the “other backward classes” (or OBCs), caste 
disadvantage is no longer presumed from traditional status alone.230 Some 
lower caste groups (jatis) have become landowners and gained political 
power.  Others have moved to urban areas where economic opportunities 
enable upward mobility.  Therefore, in order to be included in affirmative 
action set-asides, each jat has to demonstrate that it’s still “backward”—a 
term of art in Indian affirmative action law.231 
The process of identifying “backward classes” remains the 
responsibility of provincial government as caste differences vary by region.  
“Backwardness” is determined empirically by looking at a wide range of 
socio-economic indicators, analyzed on a group-by-group basis.  In other 
words, the caste (jat) as a whole is the unit of analysis.  The criteria 
examined are specifically chosen to identify the systemic effects of caste 
disadvantage.   
Both the breadth of criteria and level of detail to which such analysis 
extends are impressive.  One standard form used to collect this information 
runs over seventeen pages.232 The factors considered include the average 
income and education level of caste members,233 literacy rates, occupational 
profiles,234 land-ownership, capital resources, political representation (i.e. 
number of caste members occupying elective or civil servant posts), 
 
230 The term “backward classes” comes from the Indian Constitution and has been 
interpreted to transcend traditional caste status and incorporate a broader assessment of 
social standing.  See Balaji v. Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.  The OBC receive a separate 
quota from the Scheduled groups. 
231 See JENKINS, supra note xxx at 197-214. 
232 See “Questionnaire for consideration of requests for inclusion and complaints of 
under-inclusion in the central list of Other Backward Classes” in Jenkins, supra note xxx at 
197-214. 
233 JENKINS, supra note xx at 208-209.   
234 For example, the form inquires whether the caste is identified with a traditional 
occupation, whether such hereditary occupation is regarded as “lowly, undignified, unclear 
or stigmatized” or subject to bonded labor, and what proportion of the caste is still engaged 
in such occupation.  JENKINS, supra note xx, at 204-205. 
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housing quality, and access to infrastructure (roads, electricity, irrigation, 
etc.).  The form also inquires whether the caste’s position has improved or 
deteriorated during the last twenty years and requires applicants to furnish 
names of other comparable caste groups.235 
Wherever possible, the data are supposed to be disaggregated even 
below the jat level.  Thus, if an identifiable subgroup of the caste is doing 
much better than the others, “backwardness” should be appraised for each 
part separately so that the more “forward” part can be potentially excluded.  
Similarly, individual caste members who have enjoyed unusually privileged 
background may also be deemed ineligible.236 
In other words, India attempts to choose beneficiary groups using 
precisely the “sociological and political analysis” that Justice Powell 
thought couldn’t or shouldn’t be attempted in the US.  However, rather than 
attempt to sort between competing historical claims of past discrimination, 
India focuses on the here and now.  The idea is that groups shown to 
experience systemic disadvantage across a wide array of societal indicators 
can be presumed to be the ones most afflicted by discrimination.  Thus, 
instead of accepting the existence of caste hierarchies as frozen in time, 
India defines caste functionally in terms of subordination.   
In drawing inferences of discrimination from empirical measures, 
Indian methodology superficially resembles the underrepresentation model 
of Croson. Both rely on counting to determine affirmative action eligibility.  
However, very different kinds of counting are involved:  Whereas India 
focuses on societal disadvantage, Croson confines its analysis to 
particularized contexts.  India also employs a multifactoral, systemic 
 
235 Id. at 214. 
236 This skimming off of the so-called “creamy layer” of caste elites is constitutionally 
required.  See Indra Sawhney 3 S.C.C. 217.  Thus, OBC membership only creates a 
rebuttable presumption of eligibility.   
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analysis, whereas counting in the US focuses solely on a single indicator: 
group representation.   
The units being counted are also sized very differently.  Most 
disparity studies under Croson collect statistics based on the standard four 
“minority” categories, roughly analogous to India’s varnas. Tongans are 
thus lumped together with Bangladeshis in a pan-Asian grouping.  By 
contrast, India’s counting focuses on the jatis—the smaller units that make 
up each varna, the equivalent of counting Samoans and Bangladeshis 
separately.  Unlike the US, India’s regional analysis is also sensitive to local 
variations in caste identities. 
Fundamentally different assumptions underlie these quantitative 
measures.  In the US, a statistically significant disparity is taken as prima 
facie evidence of unlawful discrimination.  At least in theory, the counting 
is supposed to uncover actual “statutory or constitutional violations” 
traceable to the very institution seeking to grant the remedy.  By contrast, 
India makes no effort to assign individual responsibility.  It seeks to 
measure the systemic effects of enduring caste discrimination irrespective 
of their cause.   
To some extent these different emphases can be ascribed to 
differences in the way race and caste are conceived.  In the US, race is often 
considered an immutable trait, inhering in highly visible—albeit superficial 
and morally irrelevant—characteristics such as skin color.  Racial 
discrimination is conceived of in terms of discrete acts of irrational 
prejudice triggered by such phenotypic stimuli.237 Remedying 
discrimination thus entails neutralizing individual bad actors as opposed to 
broader institutional change.238 
237 Gotanda, supra note xx, at 45. 
238 Id. 
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In India, however, caste is less associated with immutable traits, but 
instead inheres in explicit social hierarchies.  Since caste is itself defined 
societally, it is more natural to think of caste discrimination as a societal 
problem that must be addressed systemically.   
B.  From India to the US: Applying the Model 
For some, the Indian approach based on societal disadvantage offers 
a more attractive means of selecting beneficiaries.  The preoccupation with 
identifying intentional bias in US law has been criticized for employing 
unrealistic assumptions about the etiology of discrimination.239 Rather than 
focusing myopically on identifiable “bad actors,” commentators have 
stressed the need to address systemic patterns of disadvantage.240 Several 
have called for the Fourteenth Amendment to be reinterpreted to move from 
an “antidiscrimination model” to an “antisubordination model.”241 In 
proposing such a paradigm shift, Cass Sunstein uses the metaphor of a 
“Constitution of Caste,” and, in fact, his definition of “caste” in terms of 
systemic societal disadvantage is reminiscent of the way India actually goes 
about identifying “backwardness.”242 
239 See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil 
Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251. 
240 Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Discrimination through Equal Protection 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (contrasting “perpetrator vs. victim” perspectives on 
discrimination).  Some commentators also argue that the Court’s existing jurisprudence 
already contains the seeds for such a paradigm shift.  E.g. Ian F. Haney López, Race, 
Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1997) 
241 See, e.g. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, PHILOSOPHY AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 5; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003; Haney López, supra note xxx. 
242 See Cunningham & Menon, supra note xx (commenting on Sunstein’s paper and 
drawing explicit comparisons with the Indian example); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1311.  Cf. Gratz,
supra note xx at 299-300 (Ginnsburg, J. concurring) (similarly likening America’s racial 
inequalities to a caste system). 
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That India offers a working model of an antisubordination program 
has not gone unnoticed by scholars of comparative affirmative action.243 In 
advocating India’s approach to the US Supreme Court, the amicus scholars 
made the case that by penetrating the “amorphous” nature of societal 
discrimination, the empirical validation supplied by Indian methodology 
could overcome jurisprudential resistance to societal remedies.244 On its 
face, the multifactoral analysis applied under the Indian approach does seem 
like a more rational answer to the Who Question.  Whereas Croson tells us 
simply to count heads without much thought about their underlying 
meaning, India employs empirical measures specifically chosen to correlate 
with the social phenomenon being targeted.  Moreover, by analyzing the 
narrowest possible units—jatis instead of varnas—using definitions tailored 
to local context, the Indian approach achieves a greater degree of precision 
which helps to avoid under- or under-inclusive remedies and thus reduces 
the concern over definitional issues.245 
India is able to work with smaller units because it is looking at caste 
societally, using a composite of many factors to map social hierarchies.  In 
looking at this broader picture of underprivilege, group size becomes less of 
a limitation than with Croson’s statistical analyses of representation.  By 
determining affirmative action eligibility through a centralized process, 
India’s approach is also more efficient than the multiple disparity studies 
that Croson demands for every particularized context. 
 
243 Cunningham & Menon, supra note xx; amicus scholars, supra note xx, at 874-75. 
244 Amicus scholars, supra note xx at 874, 881 (“India’s experience shows without a 
doubt that it is possible to design a program to remedy the effect of past discrimination in 
which beneficiary groups are designated through an objective process based on empirical 
research”). 
245 Smaller groups also generally have better defined identities, a phenomenon that 
applies in the US as much as in India.  See infra notes xx.  Therefore, while counting small 
groups does not eliminate definitional ambiguity, it minimizes it. 
62
How might such a model translate to the US context?  To return to 
the case of Rocco Luiere, recall the key question was whether Iberians 
experienced the same patterns of racial disadvantage as other Hispanics.  
Applying Indian methodology, this question could be answered by 
analyzing empirical data.   
The idea would be to use societal disadvantage as a proxy for racial 
prejudice.  This would entail gathering statistics on Iberians and other 
Hispanic subgroups, using appropriate criteria chosen to quantify patterns 
of racial subordination in the US.246 This might include examining access 
to education, average household wealth, patterns of residential segregation, 
rates of inter-racial marriage, 247 political representation, and a host of 
similar criteria.  If it turns out that Iberians do much better on these 
measures than Latinos, this could mean they’re not experiencing the same 
patterns of discrimination.248 
In fact, data from the 2000 US Census reveals that on several such 
measures, Iberians are differently situated from other Hispanic groups.  
They are significantly wealthier, better educated, and engaged in higher 
status occupations than Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, who make 
up the bulk of US Hispanics249; indeed, on many measures Iberians 
outperform the US population at large.  Almost twice as many American 
Spaniards, for example, hold a graduate degree than the US average; they 
are 25% better represented in managerial or professional occupations; and 
 
246 See Amicus scholars, supra note xx at 873 n.216 (pointing to intermarriage rates 
and patterns of “White flight”). 
247 Id. 
248 As in India, a contextualized analysis would be required to account for possible 
regional variations. 
249 Mexican-Americans (or Chicanos) are by far the largest Hispanic subgroup 
represented almost 60% of the total.  Puerto Ricans account for just under 10%.  See Table 
III for census data on Hispanic subgroups.   
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they own homes valued at 36% above the national median.250 Mexican-
Americans and Puerto Ricans living on the US Mainland, by contrast, rank 
well below the US average on all of these measures.251 
If one accepts such societal indicators as appropriate criteria to 
determine affirmative action eligibility, the case for including Iberians 
seems weak.252 Even if the popular consensus would regard them as 
Hispanic, they appear less burdened by the systemic handicaps associated 
with the larger group.253 It may be that the success of Spaniards comes in 
spite of race, not because of it.  But it is also possible that these differences 
 
250 Portuguese-Americans do slightly less well than Spaniards on these measures.  
They are somewhat less likely to hold a college degree or be a manager/professional than 
the average US resident.  But they experience poverty at only 2/3 the national rate and the 
median value of their homes exceeds that of the general populace by 34%.  See Table III.   
251 Mexican-Americans, for example, earn graduate degrees at a quarter the rate of the 
US average, they are only half as well represented in the managerial/professional classes, 
and their home values rank 20% below the national median.  See Table III.  
252 A similar argument could be made for excluding Hispanics of South American and 
Cuban origin.  Argentine-Americans fare particularly well on these measures, outstripping 
even Spaniards.   
253 The popular consensus is, in any case, influenced by the terms on which formal 
race categories are constructed.  Shifting to a narrower Latino classification would 
arguably reduce the tendency of the public to associate Iberians with other Hispanics. 
Occupation Property Income
Managerial or Median Home % below
Population Group Bachelors Graduate Professional Value Poverty Level
ALL US 15.5% 8.8% 33.6% $119,600 12.4%
HISPANIC 6.7% 3.8% 18.1% $105,600 22.6%
 Argentinean 16.2% 19.0% 42.5% $180,000 13.8%
 Spaniard 16.2% 13.7% 42.0% $162,100 12.7%
 Portuguese 13.0% 6.0% 29.9% $160,100 8.1%
 South American 14.5% 10.6% 27.7% $153,100 15.0%
 Cuban 11.5% 9.6% 31.6% $135,700 15.0%
 Central American 6.2% 3.4% 13.3% $131,400 19.9%
 Puerto Rican 8.3% 4.2% 24.2% $112,500 26.0%
 Mexican 5.0% 2.4% 14.9% $95,300 23.5%
BLACKS 9.5% 4.8% 25.2% $80,600 24.9%
Education
% earning degree
Source: 2000 U.S. Census
Table III - Socioeconomic Breakdown of Hispanic Subgroups
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in societal standing reflect genuine difference in how such subgroups 
experience race.  Scholars have identified intra-Hispanic disparities based 
on skin color.254 The lighter skin and European features of Spaniards could 
permit them to function more easily in mainstream US society.  It is also 
possible that class differences may themselves insulate societally successful 
Hispanics from the patterns of prejudice that other group members 
encounter.   
This does not mean that Rocco Luiere would never encounter racial 
prejudice, but it does suggest that Iberians, like Jews or Irish, have learned 
to navigate around it.  And we may want to focus our affirmative action 
efforts on groups that are being held back.  Since most affirmative action 
definitions of “Hispanic” still do include Iberians, a disadvantage approach 
would thus lead to a narrowing of eligibility.  A disadvantage approach 
could also be used to resist new claimants.  Rather than keeping out 
Persian-Americans on the spurious grounds relied on by the SBA, a similar 
result could be justified based on empirical data.255 
The amicus scholars have proposed generalizing such inquiries to 
“redraw the map” around which our racial compass is oriented.  They call 
for a “national bipartisan commission” to be convened to replace the 
standard categories of the quadrangle with “scientifically” redesigned 
groupings built around systemic disadvantage.256 Newly fashioned 
empirically-validated categories could then serve to allocate affirmative 
action remedies in a more targeted, rationally defensible fashion.257 
254 See Edward E. Telles & Edward Murguia, Phenotypic Discrimination and Income 
Differences amond Mexican Americans, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 683 (1990). 
Telles & Murguia, supra note xx. 
255 Census data belies any claim that Persian-Americans face societal disadvantage 
systemically.  [To be added to Appendix]. 
256 Amicus scholars, supra note xx at 880-81.     
257 Id. at 882. 
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The amicus scholars appear to contemplate using India’s model to 
answer the selection question directly based on societal disadvantage, as 
done in India itself.  This Article argues against such an approach, but will 
suggest more modest definitional uses of Indian methodology. 
C.  Demographic Challenges 
Assuming that constitutional objections to a societal approach could 
be circumvented,  could an Indian-style disadvantage model provide a 
workable answer to the Who Question as the amicus scholars suggest?  
There are significant differences in moving to the US context that would 
complicate the analysis required to implement it.  Moreover, even if such an 
approach proved workable, a further question remains whether the 
consequences would be desirable.  Arguably, Justice Powell was right to 
resist societal rankings on prudential grounds.  If so, the Indian model may 
serve as a negative example, more cautionary lesson than model to emulate.  
Exploring the reasons why points to some of the dangers lurking within the 
Who Question. 
First, consider the demographic contrasts.  India remains a largely 
rural society in which patterns of caste oppression have been entrenched 
literally over millennia.258 As a result, caste identities remain well defined.  
Most caste groups still live in their traditional villages and engage in time-
honored occupations.  Inter-caste marriage is virtually unknown.  Given 
these relatively stable baseline conditions, Indian policy-makers can 
 
258 Affirmative action has had some effect in empowering an elite drawn from at least 
some lower caste groups.  However, its benefits have been limited in comparison to the 
pool of potential beneficiaries, and, as in the US, have generally gone to those who need it 
the least.  Many lower caste groups, particularly those at the bottom end, are either not in a 
position to take advantage of affirmative action, or in many cases, are simply unaware of 
its availability.  As a result, the SC/ST reservations often go unfilled.  Jehangir S. Pocha, 
Caste Prejudice, Red Tape, Access to Villages are Hampering Government's Relief Efforts,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2005 at A10; SOWELL, supra note xxx, at xx. 
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generally presume that empirical disadvantage flows from the lingering 
effects of caste, as opposed to extrinsic causes.   
By contrast, the United States is a nation of immigrants, with a high 
degree of geographic and social mobility.  Although “ethnic niches” in the 
workforce still exist,259 occupational diversity is increasingly the rule.  
Ethnic and racial identities are not as well defined, and inter-racial marriage 
rates are rising. This makes the dynamics of group disadvantage much more 
difficult to model because it requires analyses of ambiguous and moving 
targets.   
Dealing with immigration effects would present a particular 
challenge, one which the amicus scholars as well as many subordination 
theorists appear to overlook.260 Immigrants typically arrive in positions of 
relative disadvantage and then progress up the socio-economic ladder.  In 
general, the longer they have been in the country, the better they do.261 
Such “immigration effects” skew socio-economic measures of status, and 
for groups with high rates of immigration, the distortions can be 
appreciable.  If we consider affirmative action more properly aimed at 
targeting forms of racial disadvantage that go beyond such transitory 
phenomena, we would need appropriate adjustments to isolate patterns of 
“intractable disadvantage” unrelated to immigration.262 
259 See generally Malamud, supra note xx, at 327-329. 
260 The amicus scholars begin with a “mad bomber” parable that posits a model of 
lingering disadvantage traceable to a unitary injury at time zero.  This model fails to 
address the phenomenon of immigration as a independent variable correlating with societal 
disadvantage.  Amicus scholars, supra note xx, at 836. 
261 Many components contribute to success in navigating US society:  familiarity with 
US customs, employment skills, language ability, social capital (“connections”), financial 
resources, etc.  All of these take time to cultivate. 
262 Brest & Oshige, supra note xxx uses the concept “intractable disadvantage” to 
describe such multi-generational trends.  Others might be even more demanding and seek 
to limit affirmative action solely to disadvantage that is due to (as opposed to merely 
correlative with) race. 
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This is more easily said than done.  Adjusting for “immigration 
effects” requires dealing with myriad causal variables.  Immigrants begin at 
differing starting points and their ability to progress also varies, based on 
the circumstances they face upon arrival.263 Many Hispanics have come 
across the border from Mexico or Central America, often illegally, from 
poor, rural communities, with little education, and then remain concentrated 
in linguistically isolated communities which resist assimilation.264 By 
contrast, Argentinean and Indian immigrants often arrive with higher 
education degrees in hand and go on to achieve greater successes.   
In general, Asian immigrants seem more successful at economically 
integrating than Hispanics.  Language ability may account for at least part 
of this discrepancy.  Roughly the same percentage of Asians as Hispanics 
are recent immigrants.265 However, almost half of foreign-born Hispanics 
lack the ability to function adequately in English compared to just over a 
quarter of their Asians counterparts.  About one in five Hispanic immigrants 
speak English “not at all” compared to a mere 5.6% of Asians.  
Accordingly, even legal Hispanic immigrants often remain excluded from 
opportunities for upward mobility.  On the other hand, Hispanics do not 
seem to face the same barriers to spatial mobility as Blacks, suggesting that 
their segregation is more a cultural choice than a condition of racism.266 
Second generation Hispanics are also much more likely marry outside their 
 
263.See Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration 
Prisons in the United States, 10 PUBLIC CULTURE 577-606 (1998) (contrasting varying 
conditions met by Haitians vs. Marielitos in 1980s); Anthony DePalma, 15 Years on the 
Bottom Rung, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005 at A1 (contrasting Greek vs. Mexican immigrant 
experience). 
264 GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 182-183; DePalma, supra note xx. 
265 2000 U.S. Census data, on file with the author. 
266 See Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: the Perpetuation of 
the Underclass, in John Arthur & Amy Shapiro, ed., COLOR CLASS IDENTITY: THE NEW 
POLITICS OF RACE, 138-39 (1996).
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racial groups than African-Americans, suggesting less ingrained racial 
antipathy against them.267 
Nonetheless, there are clearly some Hispanic communities that have 
been held back for generations at least partly due to racism.  Isolating such 
“racial effects” from other contingent variables requires making a number 
of subjective assumptions about the dynamics of racial prejudice, 
“institutional racism,” and the uncertain divide between culture and race,268 
all of which would severely test our understanding of “race” as a construct.   
Faced with such a demographic and sociological challenge, even the 
best social scientists given infinite time and resources might find it difficult 
to choose between competing claims of disadvantage in a way that would 
be generally accepted as fair, even assuming we could agree on what we 
were looking for.   
D. Politicization and Backlash 
In any case, in the real world, we should not expect that 
“disadvantage” would be determined through neutral social science because 
the whole process would inevitably become politicized.  Competing interest 
groups would lobby for favorable criteria and attempt to “game” the system.  
Threshold standards would be hard to maintain.  All of this has happened in 
India.  Reservation politics has influenced election campaigns and attracted 
corruption.  New groups are constantly being added to the OBC ranks, but 
very few ever get taken off the lists.   
 
267 See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 193. 
268 For example, is it really race that explains why Jamaicans succeed in place of Afro-
Americans?  If one says Jamaicans have a stronger work ethic, that’s cultural.  But if one 
says that domestic Blacks have a reputation for being lazy, that’s racist stereotyping.  
Similarly, rates of exogamy (intermarriage) are often viewed as a proxy for societal 
prejudice.  Yet, some groups exhibit preferences for endogamy for cultural reasons that 
have nothing to do with how outsiders view them. 
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In this sense, the idealized account of Indian methodology provided 
by the amicus scholars requires a dose of legal realism.  Given the more 
complex and contestable terrain which the implementation of a 
“disadvantage model” in the US would have to negotiable, one might 
expect the scope for politicization and manipulation of the process to 
increase. 
We already see a similar politicization of the disparity testing that 
contracting programs do under Croson, which critics have accused of 
relying on phony social science to achieve predetermined ends.269 And as 
we saw, the process of creating the categories we now use to count with was 
also not without its politics.  Yet, disparity testing is confined to a 
particularized context, and usually involves a contest between industry 
insiders, unbeknownst to the general public.  Similarly, the racial prehistory 
of the quadrangle largely took place behind closed doors. 
By contrast, moving to an Indian model would place the Who 
Question on a much more visible plane.  Determinations as to 
“backwardness” concern the membership of the caste as a whole and 
involve a holistic assessment of group standing, not in a limited context, but 
globally in society.  Making such assessments inevitably pits competing 
groups against one another in an adversarial process.  At stake, is not just 
eligibility for one program in one sector, but affirmative action benefits 
across the board.  The result is a much more competitive, high profile 
contest where the winners take all.  Inevitably, caste consciousness has 
become sharpened, not reduced in the process.270 
269 George R. LaNoue, supra note xx, at 12-13.   
270 Clark Cunningham (one of the amicus scholars) has in subsequent writing 
acknowledged “the widespread concern in India that caste identity has become more 
salient, not less” since implementation of the Mandal Report’s methodology for identifying 
the OBC.  Clark Cunningham After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The American Debate 
Over Affirmative Action is Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas from Abroad, 36 CONN. L. 
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This may seem an acceptable price to pay in a country where caste 
identities have already been entrenched as an instrument of oppression over 
three thousand years.271 Yet, racial identities in the US are not so well-
defined.  As with our demographics, race presents a moving target.  US 
census categories have changed dramatically over the years with all kinds of 
categories dropping in and out; they continue to be redefined today.272 
These changes arguably reflect an organic evolution of racial 
identities, a process in which the legal categories used in affirmative action 
have generally lagged behind.  The relative indeterminacy of such 
categories may therefore serve a positive value by enabling a space for 
further organic progression.  Likewise, an avoidance of overt intergroup 
rivalries helps to minimize the hardening of such identities through forced 
political mobilizations.  The Who Question thus has its tradeoffs.  Gains in 
distributive or corrective justice from pursuing increased precision and 
clarity might be outweighed by sharpened group consciousness and 
polarization.273 
The competitive element of Indian affirmative action has other 
troubling features.  Because more “forward” groups tend to usurp a lion’s 
share of benefits, groups ranked lower down the hierarchy inevitably 
 
REV. 665, 675 (2004).  Affirmative action opponents in the US often describe similar 
polarizing effects here as well.  See, e.g. Krieger, supra note xx.  However, the identity of 
the privileged groups is relatively stable, and so there is less polarizing competition  
between minority groups.   
271 I do not mean to overemphasize the rigidity of caste identities in India or to deny 
the existence of grey areas.  The formal categories used by the state (often the legacy of 
British colonial administrators) reflect an arbitrary and/or essentializing imposition of order 
on far more complex social reality.  My point is only a comparative one.  Most people 
could at least agree on a basic division of groups at the varna level (including its 
hierarchical ordering) and this consensus understanding has remained relatively stable over 
time. 
272 YANOW, supra note xx, at 83-85 (charting evolution of categories); supra notes xx.   
273 Cunningham acknowledges “[t]he concern that the fruit of ‘strict scrutiny’ of group 
selection and definition might be a counter-productive perpetuation of racial identity.”  
Cunningham, supra note xx, at 675. 
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demand their own separate quotas.  India already has two established tiers 
of beneficiaries, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes having precedence 
over the Other Backward Classes.  Competition within these groups has 
increasingly led to further distinctions whereby groups deemed “more 
disadvantaged” demand separate reservations, requiring ever more intricate 
rankings.274 Again, for a country dealing with the effects of an entrenched 
caste system, such inverted hierarchies may seem like an acceptable, even 
desirable remedy.  South Africa has taken a similar approach: prioritizing 
affirmative action eligibility according to the degree of oppression that the 
various beneficiary groups experienced under Apartheid (which was itself a 
rigidly hierarchical system).275 
Clark Cunningham has hypothesized an analogous remedial 
hierarchy in which Blacks and American Indians—the two groups that 
suffered the greatest historical injury in the US—would become privileged 
as claimants of affirmative action.276 Several courts have hinted that narrow 
tailoring may require that such distinctions be made.277 There is certainly a 
strong case to be made for African-American exceptionalism, and 
Cunningham is not the only one to advance it in the context of affirmative 
 
274 SOWELL, supra note xx.  The Indian Supreme Court recently struck down subquotas 
for the SC/ST as contrary to the constitutional mandate.  However, the OBC apparently 
remain fair game for stratified remedies. 
275 SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note xx. 
276 Cunningham, supra note xx, at 673 (drawing a further analogy comparing Black 
and Indians with, respectively, India’s Scheduled Castes and Tribes).  Cunningham stresses 
in a footnote that the analogy is made for illustrative purposes only, not as an “import 
model.”  Id. at n.37.  However, there is a logical case to be made for such a proposal.  It’s 
revealing, for example, that the SBA justified its MBE set-asides by emphasizing the 
unique historical experience of these two groups.  See LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions,
supra note xx, at 450 (quoting SBA interim rule explaining that “blacks had suffered 
‘enslavement and subsequent disfranchisement’ and Indians had endured ‘near 
extermination’” while omitting explanation of other included groups).   
277 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955 n.50 (“one would intuit that the minority group that 
has experienced the most discrimination . . . would be entitled to the most benefit from the 
designated remedy.”); Assoc. for Fairness in Bus. v. State, 82 F. Supp. 2d at353, 362 
(D.N.J. 2000) (same); Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (same). 
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action.278 However, such an approach runs strongly against the grain of 
American egalitarianism.  Even from start, when affirmative action was so 
clearly focused on redressing injustices against Negroes, policy-makers 
were reluctant to single out any one group for preferential treatment.  This 
reluctance to play favorites in favoritism appears to be widely shared, even 
among African-Americans themselves.279 Similarly, it’s notable that claims 
based on Native American singularity have focused on reclaiming 
traditional homelands and privileges rather than the sort of generalized 
preferences across society that indigenous groups, e.g., in Malaysia or Fiji 
have demanded through affirmative action.   
Making such formalized reckonings of comparative disadvantage 
and entitlement would risk offending American egalitarian values.  The US 
likes to think of itself as a classless society and a nation founded on 
universal equality.  However imperfectly that ideal has been applied in 
practice, we would likely be uncomfortable with a hierarchical system of 
affirmative action that so overtly belied it.  Even with a single-tiered 
system, the spectacle of groups competing in a collective airing of dirty 
linen would be one that many Americans would instinctively resist 
Justice Powell averted to such concerns in Bakke when, after 
dismissing a sociological ranking of racial disadvantage as outside the 
judicial competence, he questioned whether such rankings would even be 
 
278 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Glenn C. Loury, Double Talk,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 23; Orlando Patterson, THE ORDEAL OF 
INTEGRATION, at 192-193; Nathan Glazer, cited in GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 132.   
279 African-Americans have, at times, protested at the diminishment of their share of 
the affirmative action pie caused by admission of other beneficiary groups.  However, 
Black leadership groups have consistently espoused solidarity between “people of color.”  
Such coalition-building serves broader political interests, but may also reflect a calculation 
that affirmative action would be vulnerable if Blacks were the only beneficiaries.  Studies 
have also shown that African-Americans would be loathe to assume the stigma of being the 
only group singled out for special benefits.  David Sabbagh, Affirmative Action Policies: 
An International Perspective (unpublished paper on file with the author). 
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“politically feasible and socially desirable.”280 Powell’s solution in Bakke 
was to advance a model of “pluses” awarded based on an individualized 
assessment of each applicant’s diversity contribution.  Powell’s approach 
thus preserves a symbolic commitment to individualism, maintaining the 
illusion that everyone can compete equally with no group enjoying a 
superior a priori claim.281 Likewise, Croson’s disparity testing reduces 
group entitlement to a question of statistics in which no group appears to be 
a priori favored and findings of disadvantage are localized within a 
particular context.   These approaches run directly contrary to the Indian 
approach of targeted reservations based on explicit reckonings of 
comparative societal disadvantage.   
E. Purposeful Confusion 
This Article has thus far deferred discussing the underlying 
normative theories that govern affirmative action.  However, if we are to 
understand “race” in the functional manner that this Article proposes, clarity 
as to rationale is essential.  In India, the rationale for affirmative action is 
fairly well-defined: to remedy the societal effects of caste discrimination.  
Such normative clarity permits India to concentrate on identifying 
beneficiaries in a precise and transparent fashion.   
By contrast, five decades into affirmative action, America has yet to 
reach consensus on what such programs seek to accomplish.  Affirmative 
action crept into our public life almost without debate and then proliferated 
in an atmosphere of racial crisis.  An original focus on remedying historical 
injustice expanded to embrace broader objectives.  Yet, despite a now 
substantial body of affirmative action case law, the range of constitutionally 
 
280 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297. 
281 See Sean Pager, Strictness & Subsidiarity: An Institutional Perspective on 
Affirmative Action at the European Court of Justice, 26 B.C INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35 
(2003) (comparing similar approach taken by ECJ).   
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permissible rationales in the US remains uncertain.282 Affirmative action in 
the US is thus characterized by normative indeterminacy, with different 
people ascribing to it very different aims. 283 
Such uncertainty hampers our ability to answer the Who Question.  
Talking about who requires a normative theory as to why. A big reason we 
don’t talk about the who may be because we cannot agree on the why. We 
have at least two different sets of rationales—diversity and remedy—whose 
various strands and formulations are themselves subject to considerable 
ambiguity.  If you press these ambiguities, they point you in different 
directions as to which groups you might select as beneficiaries.   
The diversity rationale, in particular, encompasses a dense thicket of 
overlapping goals.  Justice Powell’s original account of diversity in Bakke 
contemplated a kind of Noah’s Ark in which universities seek the student 
body equivalent of “two of everything,” with race functioning as only one 
“plus” factor among many in the quest to showcase the full taxonomic 
variety of human kind.284 The Michigan Law School plan upheld in Grutter 
departs from this model by focusing almost exclusively on ensuring that 
certain racial groups were fully represented in “critical masses,” while 
making no real allowance for diversity from any other source, ethnic or 
otherwise.285 
The theoretical basis on which Grutter defends diversity also 
presents a far muddier account of the project.  It moves from Bakke’s 
emphasis on the heuristic benefits of diversity as an educational tool to a 
 
282 Indeed, if anything, Grutter made the picture less clear when it opened the door to 
as-yet untested rationales by disowning previous language in Croson suggesting that only 
past discrimination could justify racial preferences.  Cunningham, supra note xx, at 672.   
283 For example, defenders of racial preferences commonly invoke justifications such 
as role models and service to minority communities which the Supreme Court has 
seemingly rejected.  See, e.g. Brest & Oshige, supra note xx, (defending such a broader 
reckoning of normative aims). 
284 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322-23. 
285 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
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novel account of its function in legitimizing elite institutions.  Along the 
way, it also defends diversity as providing a civics lesson in “cross-racial 
understanding,” a response to globalization, and a public service to 
corporate recruiters.286 Taken literally, each of these normative theories has 
different implications for the groups who would be included. 
The problems posed by immigration prove particularly vexatious.  
Because such new arrivals often lack a history of persecution on US shores, 
their inclusion in affirmative action has stirred occasional controversy.287 
However, just as the original categories have expanded to embrace new 
additions, the rationales for affirmative action have been similarly stretched 
to accommodate them.288 
Should foreign-born immigrants count for diversity purposes?  It 
depends on what you think diversity is designed to accomplish.  If it’s to 
expose students to a kind of model UN which helps them compete in the 
global marketplace, then the more immigrants the better.  And why limit it 
to immigrants of color?  Alternatively, if it’s the “unique experience of 
being a racial minority” in the US which we seek to bring into the 
classroom, then immigrants may not serve the purpose as well, if their 
formative years were spent elsewhere.  This is not an abstract question.  The 
University of Texas explicitly excluded Black immigrants from affirmative 
action.289 Evidence that children of African and Caribbean immigrants are 
 
286 Id. at 306. 
287 See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 132 (quoting Lawrence Fuchs, a prominent civil 
rights thinker, as describing the inclusion of immigrants as “a historical accident for which 
there is no possible justification”); see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, ORDEAL OF 
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA’S “RACIAL” CRISIS 193 (1998); 
EDLEY, supra note xx, at 176. 
288 See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: 
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677; GRAHAM, supra 
note xx, at 195. 
289 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4 (describing Texas’ admissions preferences as 
applying only to “American blacks,” but not “a black citizen of Nigeria”).  And at least one 
federal court of appeals has questioned giving “African-American a hemispheric meaning.”  
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displacing descendents of Negro slavery in elite universities has caused 
concern elsewhere.290 
Other theories of diversity point to similarly conflicting 
prescriptions.  For example, Grutter emphasized the value of diversity as an 
agent of societal legitimization by demonstrating that “the path to 
leadership [is] visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity.”  Presumably, this “demonstration” is aimed most 
directly at the specific groups whose representation is being furnished.  
Therefore, a legitimization model argues for a definition of group 
boundaries determined by the group itself because the model would only 
work to the extent that the group accepted the admittee as its own.  By 
contrast, the rationale of promoting “cross-racial understanding” and 
breaking down stereotypes would push in the direction of an externalized 
view of race because the stereotypes being targeted are held by outsiders.  
Depending on which perspective you adopt, you might end up with very 
different groups.291 
Similar ambiguities arise under a remedial rationale.  This paper has 
advocated defining beneficiaries based on the contours by which 
discrimination is targeted.  One might ask, however, from whose 
perspective is such “targeting” assessed: the victim, the perpetrator, or some 
“objective” observer?292 Courts have sometimes assumed a “bigot’s-eye 
 
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 159 (4th Cir. 1994) (questioning award of racial 
scholarship to student from Jamaica). 
290 See supra note xx.  A similar controversy has arisen over foreign-born “minority” 
faculty hires.  GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 162 (reporting that 56% of University of 
Michigan’s Asian faculty were foreign born and over half of all Stanford’s “minority” 
hires).  .   
291 See McGowan, supra note xx, at 135 (describing asymmetries in perceptions of 
racial identity).  Normally, one would expect group insiders to make finer distinctions.  Id. 
at 133-34.  But see Lee, supra note xx, at 184 (describing study in which African-
Americans accepted Black immigrants as “Black,” but Koreans merchants distinguished 
them). 
292 Of course, in practice, we may have very little information about the actual 
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view” governs.293 However, what if the perpetrator was mistaken or 
oblivious to the racial identity of his victims?294 To answer, we need a 
clearer idea of what the remedy is designed to do.  For example, to “make 
whole” an aggrieved community, one might assume an insider perspective 
to appease those whom the community regards as its own.  A prophylactic 
aim would push toward the bigot’s eye view because you need to know 
who’s next in line.295 Or if the only point is corrective justice with respect 
to individual, but unidentified victims, one might simply draw the narrowest 
class who might plausibly have been harmed.     
As with diversity, particular problems arise with respect to 
immigration.  For example, a city may have enacted a remedy based on 
identified disparities in a Hispanic population composed mostly of Puerto 
Ricans.  Whether Guatemalans migrants arriving after the remedy was 
enacted should share its benefits depends on the purpose of the remedy.  
Under a strictly retrospective view, one might argue that including 
Guatemalans who have not actually suffered the discrimination could 
violate narrow tailoring.296 However, if one considers the remedy as 
designed to counteract ongoing patterns of discrimination then Guatemalans 
 
targeting in so far as the “discrimination” is only inferred from statistical disparities.  
293 See Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991) (defining race 
from external perspective of discriminators); Montana Contractors, 460 F. Supp. at xx. 
294 Cabbie Slain in Shooting, Fiery Crash, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2002 at B1 
(describing Sikh mistaken for Arab).  Racial animus need not be triggered by specific 
stereotypes or racial hostility—it might be enough that the victims were simply of a visibly 
different background and regarded as “the other.”  Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. 
Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 'Regarded As' Black, and Why Title VII Should 
Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White",2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (2005). 
295 Cf. amicus scholars, supra note xx, at 872 (suggesting that selecting on the basis of 
externally visible differences “makes sense if the primary purpose . . . is to provide a 
prophylactic against anticipated future [discriminatory] behavior”). 
296 Including subgroups who may not have been present at the time the discrimination 
was measured, on a purely retrospective view could be equated to Richmond’s Aleuts.  See 
supra notes xxx and accompanying text. 
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might be justifiably included to the extent such prejudice is likely to impact 
them in the future.297 
Case law on this question has been ambiguous.  Croson was 
premised on an explicitly retrospective rationale that criticized Richmond 
for including groups who had not “actually suffered” the discrimination 
being remedied.  However, courts have expressed differing views as to 
whether a prophylactic remedy is precluded in other cases.298 At root lies 
the undertheorized nature of racially-targeted remedies.  As anomalies 
within the dominant individualist tenor of US equality law, existing 
jurisprudence has yet to fully come to grips with their meaning.299 
There are also fundamental ambiguities as to the meaning of 
“discrimination” itself.  Courts usually cognize racial prejudice in terms of 
hostile acts of bigotry by identifiable individuals.  Their rejection of societal 
rationales for affirmative action stems in part from an aversion to notions of 
racial guilt or entitlement.300 Cabining the Who Question within 
particularized contexts serves this ideological project, but fails to address 
more ambiguous structural barriers within such contexts.301 
297 But see EDLEY, supra note xx (raising a “coming to the nuisance” rationale for 
excluding such immigrants.) 
298 Compare Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1408-09 (11th Cir. 
1991), Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio S.up. Ct.,.), with Assoc. Gen’l 
Contractors of Ohio, 214 F.3d 730 (retrospective critique of same program). 
299 Justifications for such group remedies have been hinted at in earlier Title VII cases, 
but never definitively established.  Compare Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 324, 364-67 (1977) (purpose of group remedy limited to reaching actual or 
potential victims of past discrimination) with Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 449-50, 477 (1986) (broader prospective goals of 
reforming internal dynamics to remove ongoing barriers to minority advancement).   
300 Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, concurring); Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-
Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-Affirmative-Action Position: From 
Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 445 (2003). 
301 Such barriers may or may not reflect racial prejudice, and their implications remain 
undertheorized.   Similarly, a categorical tailoring model presupposes targeted bigotry 
directed against identifiable groups.  Yet, racial disparities often result from “Old Boy 
networks” which benefit insiders out of self-interest more than discriminatory animus 
against any particular “out” group.  Existing doctrine fails to account for such a model, and 
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These ambiguities in the rationales used to justify US affirmative 
action limit our ability to answer the Who Question with any precision.302 
To choose between divergent approaches, we would have to commit to a 
normative theory of affirmative action, a task the Supreme Court has 
managed to avoid.303 Our current methodology elides the question of 
rationale, allowing us to remain agnostic.  We simply count heads without 
questioning whom we’re counting or why.   
All of this suggests that there may be the sound reasons to avoid 
pressing the Who Question too far if the benefits of precision and clarity 
may come at too high a price.  Of course, some would argue that the 
solution lies in the abolition of racial preferences all together.  Yet, for 
better or worse, race-consciousness remains a project to which our nation 
seems committed for the foreseeable future.  Affirmative action arguably 
fulfills a vital role in our national politics, serving as a form of collective 
atonement for our racial sins.  The failure of the Gingrich Revolution to 
repeal federal affirmative action (something that the current Republican 
majority has never even touched since) signaled that even conservatives 
have grudgingly accepted this fait accompli.304 We might not be able to 
agree on the precise objectives, but the overall direction remains fixed.   
 
courts have disagreed as to its remedial implications.  Compare Adarand Constructors, 
Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1556 with Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042. 
302 There are, in any case, practical limits to the precision that can be achieved in 
assessing pathways of racial targeting or diversity values.  However, the ambiguities as to 
purpose prevent us from even trying. 
303 See Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 Ohio St. L. J. 
79, 81 (1994) (describing incoherence resulting from Supreme Court majorities “papering 
over strong philosophical differences”).  
304 See id. (describing “broad societal acceptance” of affirmative action).  This is not to 
deny that race-conscious affirmative action remains controversial nor that efforts at 
abolition continue.  See Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis of 
Proposition 209, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 3, 6-7 & n.24 (1999) (describing repeals of 
affirmative action through voter initiative); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection 
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (describing the ‘Texas 10’ 
race neutral alternative). 
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When there are no good answers, sometimes it’s better to leave our 
options open.  Intentionally opaque rulings can serve as a judicial strategy 
to avoid entering unnecessarily divisive territory and preserve a space for 
political compromise.305 Commentators often cite Justice Powell’s Bakke 
opinion as Exhibit A.  As they see it, Powell’s opinion represents a carefully 
crafted formula that finesses the most objectionable and problematic aspects 
of affirmative action.306 By preserving a symbolic commitment to 
individualism, the opinion masks the realities of racial preferences in what 
many have hailed as an act of statesmanlike genius.307 
Some see Grutter and Gratz as continuing this legacy.  The opinions 
continue to pay rhetorical homage to flexibility and individuality, while 
glossing over the problematic issue of “critical masses” and culminating in 
split outcomes that seem to reward opaqueness over transparency.308 
Croson contains its own jurisprudential genuflection to individualism, by 
requiring provisions for waivers and challenges on a case by case basis.309 
Croson also exploits crucial ambiguities as to the meaning of its “prima 
facie” showing of discrimination and the degree of state involvement 
contemplated by its “passive participation” theory.310 
305 Pildes & Niemi, supra note xx; Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1315. 
306 See Keith J. Bybee, The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 263 (2000) (summarizing commentary). 
307 See, e.g. David Sabbagh, The Judicial Uses of Subterfuge, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 411, 
419, 433 (2003) (arguing “affirmative action . . . being . . . a deliberate attempt at reducing 
the degree of racial identification in the United States must be concealed in order to 
achieve its intended effect”); Robert Post, Intro: After Bakke, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 4
(1998). 
308 See Cunningham, supra note xx, at 676. 
309 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508.  Use of such procedures would be rare.  The challenge 
procedure, in particular, would seem almost impossible to substantiate.  Yet, they serve a 
symbolic function in reassuring us that flexibility and individualized review remain 
sanctified values. 
310 See generally Ian Ayres & Fredrick E.Vars, When Does Private Discrimination 
Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577 (1998). 
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Arguably, each of these gray areas represent carefully negotiated 
political compromises perpetuated in the Court’s case law.  Avoiding a 
sharp resolution of the Who Question may be another example where such 
strategic ambiguity serves a positive value.  Powell’s rejection of societal 
rankings epitomizes the determination of the Court to eschew the divisive 
effect of resolving competing claims to racial injustice.  By creating the 
illusion that no group enjoys a superior a priori claim to “diversity,” 
Powell’s Bakke opinion implicitly denies the societal reality of race.  
Croson’s reliance on “objective” indicia of disparities similarly avoids any 
need to look behind the numbers.  It’s not that the Court cannot choose 
between groups, but that it chooses not to. 
 
III. Finding the Balance   
This paper has suggested there may be reason to hesitate before 
pushing the Who Question too far.  The argument for ambiguity, however, 
is based on a tradeoff between competing values, and where we draw the 
line is open to debate.  The risks in raising the Who Question does not mean 
we should give up and accept the quadrangle as a fait accompli. Even if 
India’s methodology is not the answer to our Who Question, it might have 
more modest uses.  And if we can’t agree on a single answer, we should at 
least think about who should be making the decisions. 
A. India Revisited—à la Carte 
Although we may reject India’s approach as an alternative to 
Croson, there remain features of the Indian model that we could benefit 
from adopting with respect to definitional issues.  Croson’s disparity 
analyses remains a black box whose output is only as reliable as the data we 
input.  Measuring underrepresentation using our current categories does not 
tell us much because these categories are not narrowly tailored to answer 
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the questions we ask of them.  India’s example offers several ways the 
status quo could be improved. 
For example, even if we continue to count heads under an 
underrepresentation model, it would not hurt to follow the Indian practice of 
disaggregating categories to their logical limit.  Where underrepresentation 
is measured on a national scale, it makes no sense to collect data using only 
a few broad categories.311 Even in local contexts, where particular ethnic 
groups have a strong presence and a distinct identity, cities should consider 
counting them separately where possible.312 
Working with narrower categories would minimize definitional 
ambiguities:  It’s much easier to agree on who is Iberian or Argentinean 
than who is Hispanic, as national origin provides a stable reference point.313 
Counting with smaller units would also permit more narrowly-tailored 
remedies to be drawn, preventing Iberians from usurping benefits at the 
expense of Puerto-Ricans.  Some universities already make such 
distinctions.  The University of Hawaii targets only selected Asian Pacific 
subgroups for diversity admissions.  Stanford limits Hispanic eligibility to 
Chicanos and Puerto Ricans.314 Such practices should be expanded.   
This is not to deny the relevance of broader racial identities or to 
attempt to replace race with ethnicity.315 It is simply to recognize that race 
 
311 Incredibly, the federal government’s most recent disparity study did not even bother 
to disaggregate that far.  See Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal 
Procurement, 61 Fed Reg 26,042 (May 23, 1996) (calculating underrepresentation of 
“minorities” as a single masse). 
312 In other words, choose the narrowest categories of ethnic identity to which the 
sociopathology of stereotyping and discrimination might conceivably be responsive and for 
which statistically meaningful results can be obtained.  
313 There would admittedly still be definitional challenges posed by multiples 
migrations.  Cf. Bennun, 941 F.2d at 173.  However, such inevitable controversies can be 
resolved on a case by case basis. 
314 Brest & Oshige, supra note xx, at 892-93. 
315 Data compiled based on subgroups can always be reconstituted to provide a picture 
of the larger group.   
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itself is contextually contingent and that the salient contours of racial 
identity vary.  Disaggregation would challenge the assumption that the 
quadrangle represents the only organizing paradigm by which race can be 
viewed, undermining monolithic assumptions about racial identities and 
perhaps helping us to transcend them.   
India’s example also underscores the importance of attentiveness to 
societal context.316 Affirmative action categories should reflect patterns of 
regional disadvantage, even if this means departing from quadrangular 
conventions.317 French-Acadians have a history in Louisana that justifies 
distinguishing them from Whites.  Likewise, counting Native Hawaiians 
separately makes sense in Hawaii.  Even non-ethnic groups such as 
Appalachian Whites may deserve special attention.     
Finally, there is no reason why such categories could not be 
informed by empirical data of the sort India relies on.  New York’s dilemma 
over whether to count Iberians as Hispanic is one that countless other 
jurisdictions continue to face: deciding who qualifies as a “minority.”  An 
empirical approach, even if imperfect, could provide a metric to draw 
definitional lines that would at least be preferable to relying on the 
uninformed intuition of judges and federal bureaucrats.318 
Iberians represent an easy case being as much European as Hispanic.  
However, it’s time to challenge presumptions of affirmative action 
eligibility that turn solely upon “non-White” status.  Particularly in 
economic contexts such as public contracting, there seems little justification 
for awarding blanket preference to socio-economic overachievers such as 
 
316 Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (context matters in racial equality cases). 
317 See EDLEY, supra note xx, at 175  
318 Cf. Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1313-1314 (urging greater attention to empirical 
facts in affirmative action jurisprudence). 
84
East and South Asians.319 This is not to deny that even successful minority 
groups face instances of racial prejudice.  Yet, existing discrimination law 
affords them retrospective relief.320 The extraordinary remedy of voluntary 
affirmative action should be reserved for those who face more intractable 
racial barriers.  Only persistent ingrained racism provides a justification for 
acting proactively as well as a principled basis for privileging this form of 
“diversity” over all others. 
That said, relying on Indian methodology to definitively identify 
subordinated groups may be impractical.  A more modest goal would be to 
rely on societal data to rule out groups which are clearly not being “held 
back” on account of race and focus on those which might be.  Thus, rather 
than making societal disadvantage the sole determinant of eligibility, as in 
India, such societal selection would serve only as a threshold test to refine 
the categories we count with in particular contexts.  By constructing racial 
categories confined to at least plausibly disadvantaged minority groups, we  
would make more tenable Croson’s blind equation of underrepresentation 
with discrimination.321 
Such socio-economic analyses need not culminate in a formalized 
set of rankings, nor be treated as dispositive.  Indeed, the problem with 
India’s approach may have as much to do with its reliance on high-profile, 
winner-takes-all contests as with its underlying aims.  As a starting point, 
 
319 See, e.g. Timothy Bates, The Changing Nature of Minority Business: A 
Comparative Analysis of Asian, Nonminority, and Black-Owned Businesses, 18 REV.
BLACK POLI ECON. 25, supra note xx at 26 (1989) (“Asians are not a disadvantaged group: 
their eligibility for government minority business set-aside[s] . . . is completely 
inappropriate”). 
320 The mere possibility of discrimination seems inadequate to support a presumption 
of entitlement.  Arab-Americans also face discrimination; so do Hasidic Jews.  But these 
groups are generally denied affirmative action.  How are Indian-Americans any different?  
321 Indeed, we already make such distinctions.  If tomorrow Swedish contactors 
happened to be found statistically underrepresented in New York, a court would think long 
and hard before presuming discrimination from such prima facie evidence because 
Swedish are not seen as a racially subordinated group.  There seems no reason to award 
such a presumption to other highly successful minority groups. 
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we could begin merely by making sure we gather the necessary data broken 
down by subgroup and funding social science research to interpret it.  Such 
research should also examine more carefully the links between immigration 
and ethnic disadvantage to help control for “immigration effects” and 
enable a more meaningful debate on immigrant participation in affirmative 
action.322 Policy responses to the findings that emerge could then be 
determined on a program by program basis. 
All of these steps would serve to alleviate the “narrow tailoring” 
concerns that judges have increasingly raised as constitutional roadblocks to 
affirmative action.  We’ve been painting our racial landscape in primary 
colors for too long.  It’s time to take a more chromatically differentiated 
view which takes note of the ever more diverse spectrum of hues 
represented in our  citizenry.  India’s example offers a useful starting point 
to accomplish this. 
B. Who Decides the Who Question?   
This Article has suggested ways that our current approach could be 
improved.  However, perhaps the more pressing question is to think about 
how we might get there and, in particular, whether change can be better 
achieved through law or politics.  In other words, who should decide the 
Who Question?  Here too, India offers an instructive example. 
There is a natural tendency to constitutionalize equality issues.323 
Recent case law suggests this process is well under way for the Who 
Question.  Constitutionalizing the Who Question means vesting key 
decisions with courts, restricting the license for institutional 
 
322 See Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants: The Unintended 
Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES, at 54-55 (noting dearth of scholarly analysis or 
empirical data exploring connections between immigration and affirmative action).   
323 Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Shaw v. Reno. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).  Indeed, 
some argue there is a tendency in America to constitutionalize every contentious issue.   
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experimentation and increasing the demand for precision and clarity.  Yet, 
as this Article has suggested, searching for a single, definitive answer in this 
manner might prove infeasible and/or unwise.   
In an ideal world, individual affirmative action programs would 
tailor their answers to their specific needs in an evolutionary process that 
would permit a new consensus on race to emerge organically.324 There is 
some suggestion of such incremental change.  As Rocco Luiere bears 
witness, the meaning of “Hispanic” is being challenged by a new Latino 
identity that excludes Iberians and is more overtly “racial” than “ethnic.”325 
A similar effort can be seen in the emerging distinction between “Afro-
Americans”—the “original” African-American descendents of former 
slaves—and Black immigrant groups.326 
Yet, such departures from quadrangular orthodoxy remain more the 
exception than the rule.  While Pacific-Islanders may have won Census 
recognition as an independent group, most affirmative action programs still 
lump them together with other Asians.  Without external prompting, such 
programs have little incentive to change as adherence to quadrangular 
orthodoxy remains the path of least resistance.327 Efforts to dislodge any of 
the established groups from their privileged position have met fierce 
resistance.328 Such changes as do occur may be more politically motivated 
 
324 Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (2001); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
325 See Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Birth of a ‘Latino Race,’ LOS ANGELES TIMES,
December 29, 2004, at B11 (describing a growing trend among Latinos to identify as a 
distinct race).   
326 Patterson, supra note xx. 
327 See supra notes xxx. 
328 See id.; LaNoue & Sullivan, supra note xx, at 441 (relating anecdote about 
proposed removal of Asian-Americans and Indians from list of “official minorities”—
nobody disagreed on the merits, but the Chairman was “unwilling to take the political heat 
that the removal would generate”); LaNoue, supra note xx (describing opposition to 
Croson studies that get the “wrong” answer).  
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than based on objective merits.329 Affirmative action is not supposed to be 
an ethnic spoils system.  Yet, the political economy of ethnic identities 
clearly operates in a far from optimal manner.   
There is therefore a case for a “market regulator” in the form of 
legal compulsion.  By forcing the Who Question under the rubric of strict 
scrutiny, courts have challenged the complacency of the status quo.  As we 
have seen, such judicial skepticism has taken many different avenues, 
exposing the quadrangle’s flaws on many levels.330 
Yet, such criticism often fails to acknowledge the inherent difficulty 
of conforming ambiguous and subjective questions of racial identity to 
precise judicial standards.  Race is messy.  To normalize it within fixed 
categories, you have to impose an artificial rigidity on what are inherently 
fluid identities.331 Such arbitrary decisions are not the sort of thing that can 
be easily justified under heightened standards of scrutiny.332 Moreover, as 
Justice Powell noted, courts are not institutionally suited to perform such 
“variable sociological analyses.”333 
This Article has suggested several reasons to refrain before pushing 
the Who Question too far.  The “identities market” may be imperfect, but a 
judicially mandated “command and control” approach could do more harm 
than good.  However, even if we agreed to consign the Who Question to the 
realm of politics, it is difficult to see how such a laissez faire model can be 
squared with current constitutional doctrine.  When it comes to race, the 
Court has made it clear that the Equal Protection Clause has no tolerance for 
 
329 See supra notes xx.   
330 See supra notes xx. 
331 See YANOW supra note xx, at viii, 150; cf. JENKINS, supra note xx, at 67-68 
(making similar argument regarding classification of identities in general). 
332 If every Rocco Luiere can invoke strict scrutiny and force a city to justify its choice 
of affirmative action categories as objectively justified and narrowly tailored for every 
possible subgroup included or omitted, strict review could become fatal in fact, contrary to 
Adarand’s assurances.  The challenge is to find a principled stopping point short of that. 
333 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297. 
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“the product of rough compromise struck by contending groups within the 
democratic process.”334 
The Who Question is thus caught in a catch-22.  While courts 
remain loathe to tackle the imponderables of race and are ill-equipped to do 
so, strict scrutiny permits little leeway for them to defer to anybody else.  
The Supreme Court appears to deal with this problem primarily through 
avoidance and indirection.  Many lower courts have been similar equivocal 
and ambivalent.335 Yet, as courts more ideologically hostile to affirmative 
action begin to tackle the Who Question in earnest, the irreconcilable 
ambiguities of race are becoming dangerously exposed.336 
Fortunately, the dichotomy between “law” and “politics” need not 
be as stark as current doctrine suggests.  India offers an alternative that 
bridges the two extremes.  Courts are hardly the only institutional actors 
qualified to administer a rule-based regime.  India’s approach to the Who 
Question instead emphasizes an administrative model.  Although the Indian 
Supreme Court remains an active protagonist in shaping constitutional 
doctrine governing caste reservations, the Court has recognized that the 
selection of affirmative action beneficiaries is primarily a political decision.  
It has confined the role of the judiciary to articulating the principles that 
bound the exercise of political discretion and ensure that the selection 
process is conducted in an objective, transparent manner, pursuant to 
established standards.337 
There is already a precedent for this kind of intermediate approach 
 
334 Bakke 438 U.S. at 299 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
335 See supra note xxx. 
336 Indeed, Croson itself is partly to blame for this.  Its tentative foray into categorical 
tailoring issues by harping on Richmond’s Aleuts opened a Pandora’s box.  Policing for 
“random inclusiveness” now features as a staple of lower court narrow tailoring analysis 
although the meaning of “random-ness” remains woefully undertheorized. 
337 See Indra Sawhney, 3 S.C.C. 217 (endorsing proposed weighting of 11 socio-
economic factors as exemplar of “objective” assessment of disadvantage, while not 
precluding comparable alternatives).  
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within the US equal protection case law on race-conscious voter districting, 
which itself represents the political equivalent of affirmative action.338 The 
US Supreme Court has recognized that drawing election districts is a 
political exercise in which courts should hesitate to intervene.339 To ensure 
this discretion is respected, the Court has declared that the consideration of 
race in drawing of district boundaries will not automatically render such 
decisions suspect.340 Instead, the Court will apply strict scrutiny only where 
racial considerations so override “traditional districting principles” that a 
racial gerrymander becomes manifest.341 
US courts could undertake a similar role with respect to the Who 
Question—requiring only that affirmative action categories be chosen 
through a transparent process and conform to “categorical tailoring” 
principles, analogous to traditional districting.  Judicial interventions would 
be justified only when the results are manifestly inconsistent with these 
basic guidelines or otherwise exhibit indicia of favoritism.342 Such tailoring 
principles could be developed in common law fashion through experience.  
As a starting point, some of the suggestions this Article has made could be 
adopted: e.g. requiring disaggregation into subcategories where feasible, 
eliminating “forward” subgroups, controlling for immigration effects, and 
 
338 Farber, supra note xx, at 924 (describing efforts to create majority minority districts 
to boost election of minority candidates); cf. Jenkins, supra note xx, at 756 (describing 
quotas for political representation as part of Indian affirmative action).  Both race-
conscious districting and affirmative action involve classifications used to sort participants 
(voters or beneficiaries) into discrete categories based on their affiliation with an identified 
community.  The key difference with districting is that it operates on a facially race-neutral 
basis:  Voters are assigned to a district based on their residence, a criterion that may be 
only indirectly linked to ethnicity.  However, the Supreme Court has held that racial 
gerrymanders, where sufficiently blatant, can be deemed equivalent to facial classifications 
by race.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995). 
339 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1993). 
340 Miller, 515 U.S. at 905.   
341 Id. (identifying such principles as compactness, contiguity, and respect for existing 
communities)  
342 Cf. Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at *46 (scrutinizing construction of 
Hispanic category for signs of favoritism). 
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focusing on regional context.343 Courts have already begun to tinker with 
several such steps.344 This proposal would merely unify their efforts under 
a coherent doctrinal rationale.  As with the voter districting cases, the 
substance and scope of such judicial review might prove erratic, although 
perhaps no worse than the present status quo.  In any case, this Article has 
already suggested that when it comes to the Who Question, there are 
benefits to ambiguity as well as costs.345 
IV. Conclusion 
Affirmative action in the US has avoided the Who Question for too 
long.  We continue to count heads using outdated and overinclusive 
categories without thinking about what we are doing or why.  Non-
disadvantaged groups such as Iberians benefit from affirmative action, 
while Samoans and Laotians are denied admission to college because there 
are “too many Asians.”  More is at stake here than just somebody’s job, 
contract, or university slot.  Racial equality remains a core moral issue in 
this country.  And the construction of affirmative action categories is 
freighted with issues of personal identity whose outcome will determine 
how we think of ourselves as a people.  Therefore, if we are going to 
continue to do affirmative action by the numbers, it’s worth thinking about 
counting the ones that matter most.   
As courts increasingly force the issue under the rubric of strict 
scrutiny, shades of gray on questions of color can no longer be papered 
over.  Yet, such cases also demonstrate that we lack the doctrinal and 
 
343 See supra notes xx and accompanying text. 
344 See supra notes xx and accompanying text. 
345 Cf. Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1315-16 (describing benefits of Supreme Court’s 
“casuistical, rule-free, fact-specific course in the context of affirmative action” as 
simultaneously provoking public debate through incremental rulings while leaving space 
for democratic resolution of underlying issues). 
91
methodological tools to tackle this problem.  India offers an alternative 
model that we can usefully consider before continuing down this road, both 
to emulate—and to avoid. 
